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CHAPTER ONE 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO OIL AND GAS SECTOR IN TANZANIA 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the oil and gas sector in Tanzania. It revisits the history of 
the oil and gas exploration activities in the country and the methodologies adopted. 
It introduces a few key concepts relevant to the sector which are adopted throughout 
this study. Further, it states the current state of the industry and justifies the need for 
this study. For a start, part 1.1 identifies some key terms as defined in the national 
gas policy of Tanzania. 
 
1.2 Definition of key terms 
1.2.1Upstream activities 
“Upstream activities include exploration, appraisal, development and production 
stages of oil and gas operations of wells that recover and bring the crude oil and/or 
raw natural gas to the delivery point.”1 
 
1.2. 2 Midstream activities 
“Refer to the gathering, compression and processing functions required between the 
wellhead and the transmission system. Mid-stream facilities and activities are found 
at any location where natural gas is produced, transported or sold.”2 
 
1.2. 3 Downstream activities 
“The marketing and distribution of natural gas and products derived from natural 
gas. Such products include liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), diesel, plastics, fertilizers, 
pesticides and pharmaceuticals.”3  
                                                          
1 Ministry for Energy and Minerals The National Natural Gas Policy of Tanzania (2013) VII. 
2 Ministry for Energy and Minerals The National Natural Gas Policy of Tanzania (2013) VI. 
3 Ministry for Energy and Minerals The National Natural Gas Policy of Tanzania (2013) V. 
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1.2. 4 Liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
“LNG is a liquid form of natural gas, which has been cooled to about minus 1620 C 
(minus 2600 F) at normal pressure. The liquefaction converts the gaseous phase into 
an easily transportable liquid whose volume is approximately 600 times less than the 
original volume of natural gas.”4 
1.3 Background to the study 
Oil and gas exploration in Tanzania has a long history. The country first started 
exploration activities in 1952.5 However, it is only in 1974 and 1982 that the first 
natural gas discoveries were made by Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi’s (ENI) subsidiary 
Azienda Generale Italiana Petroli (AGIP).6 These discoveries were made at Songo 
Songo and Mnazi Bay, respectively.7 
It was three decades later that commercial production of the first gas discovery 
commenced. The Songo Songo gas field started to commercially produce in 2004.8 
The first commercial production was delivered to the country’s capital the same year 
through a built pipeline.9While efforts to commercially produce the initial discovery 
were going on, Tanzania never stopped oil and gas exploration.10 It went on 
attracting companies to undertake major explorations for oil and gas.11  
                                                          
4 Ministry for Energy and Minerals The National Natural Gas Policy of Tanzania (2013) V available at 
http://www.tanzania.go.tz/egov_uploads/documents/Natural_Gas_Policy_-_Approved_sw.pdf (accessed 28 
September 2014).  
5 See foreword to Ministry for Energy and Minerals The National Natural Gas Policy of Tanzania (2013) 
available at http://www.tanzania.go.tz/egov_uploads/documents/Natural_Gas_Policy_-_Approved_sw.pdf 
(accessed 28 September 2014).  
6 US Energy Information Administration ‘Emerging East Africa Energy’ (2013) available at 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/East_Africa/eeae.pdf (accessed 28 September 2014). 
7 See foreword to Ministry for Energy and Minerals The National Natural Gas Policy of Tanzania (2013)1. 
8 Berg M, Agasoster M &Grammeltvedt E ‘Natural Gas in East Africa 2012’ available at 
http://www.ipt.ntnu.no/~jsg/undervisning/naturgass/oppgaver/Oppgaver2012/12Berg.pdf  (accessed 05 
October 2014). 
9 US Energy Information Administration ‘Emerging East Africa Energy’ (2013) available at 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/East_Africa/eeae.pdf (accessed 28 September 2014). 
10 Economic and Social Research Foundation Petroleum Exploration Study, A Baseline Survey Report 
(2009) 13. 
11 Economic and Social Research Foundation Petroleum Exploration Study, A Baseline Survey Report 
(2009) 13.  
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Some of these measures involved the 1986 -2009 reforms of political, social, economic 
and monetary policies with a view to enabling international oil companies, among 
others, to invest and explore in the petroleum sector for the benefit of all parties. 
There were also already in place some legal and regulatory frameworks to provide 
for rules, procedures and authorities that would eventually oversee the oil and gas 
sector in Tanzania.12At this point, the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act 27 
of 198013 (PEP Act) and the Tanzania Petroleum Development Company (TPDC) 
were in place.14 
The TPDC is a Tanzanian State corporation through which the Ministry of Energy 
and Minerals implements its petroleum exploration and development policies.15 It 
was established under the Public Corporations Act 17 of 196916 by Government 
Notice 140 of 30 May 1969.17The Corporation began operations in 1973.18 TPDC is a 
wholly owned government parastatal, with all the shares held by the Treasury 
Registrar.19 
The following two parts of this section give a brief summary of the current situation 
regarding exploration for, and production of, oil and gas in Tanzania. The first part 
highlights the number of total discoveries made so far. The second part deals with 
the economic potential that these discoveries bring about. The third part highlights 
prospects for oil discovery.   
                                                          
12 Economic and Social Research Foundation Petroleum Exploration Study, A Baseline Survey Report 
(2009) 13. 
13 Cap 328 RE 2002. In Tanzania laws are referred to by their Chapter (Cap) in the revised edition (RE) 
of the laws of Tanzania of 2002. 
14 Economic and Social Research Foundation Petroleum Exploration Study, A Baseline Survey Report 
(2009) 13. 
15Kulthum B The Natural Gas Sector in Tanzania. Suggestions for a Better Framework to Benefit the Country 
(unpublished LLM Thesis, University of Lapland, 2013) 25. 
16 The Act is now repealed and replaced by the Public Corporations Act, Cap 257 R.E.2002. 
17 Available at http://www.tpdc-tz.com/tpdc/About_Us.php (accessed 05 October 2014). 
18 Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation 30th Annual Report (2005) 2. 
19 Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation 30th Annual Report (2005) 2. 
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1.3.1 Gas discoveries and their impact 
As of June 2013 total onshore and offshore natural gas discoveries had reached about 
42.7 trillion cubic feet (being 7.5 billion barrels of oil equivalent (BoE))20 On the other 
hand, prospects for oil discovery are still increasing.21 
The oil and gas sector is poised to take Tanzania’s economy to the next level, once 
full production is in place. But until then, benefits of the sector gradually start to be 
realised, despite a number of challenges. For instance, the Songo Songo gas field is 
providing gas for power generation input to the national grid, and for some Dar es 
Salaam manufacturing industries’ direct power users.22 The Mnazi Bay gas field, 
which has been producing since early 2007, is providing power for the southern 
areas of Mtwara, Lindi, Masasi, Newala and Nachingwea.23 At the time of writing 
this thesis, more gas is being discovered.24 
1.3.2 Investment potential 
It is argued that to commercialise Tanzania’s offshore reserves of natural gas will 
take time. Some estimates are that it will take between seven years and a decade.25 
After commercialisation has been achieved, this would be followed by the design 
and negotiation of investment proposals. If LNG export project were to be realised, 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects that FDI into Tanzania could be in 
the US $20billion - $30billion range. According to the IMF, the peak level of 
                                                          
20 Ministry for Energy and Minerals The National Natural Gas Policy of Tanzania (2013) 1.  
21Mugini J ‘Tanzania: With gas already in its bag Tanzania's Rift System set to become next oil 
frontier’ The Daily News 11 July 2014 available at http://allafrica.com/stories/201407110285.html(accessed 
01 October 2014). 
22Muhongo S ‘Tanzania: An  Emerging Energy Producer’ available at 
http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Africa/260213presentation.pdf  
(accessed 05 October 2014). 
23 PWYP ‘Tanzania Oil & Gas: Status and Trend Study Report 2013’available at 
http://publishwhatyoupay.org/sites/publishwhatyoupay.org/files/Tanzania%20Oil%20and%20Gas%20Trend%
20and%20Status%20Report.pdf(accessed 05 October 2014). 
24Statoil ‘Statoil makes its eighth discovery in Block 2 offshore Tanzania’ available at 
http://www.statoil.com/en/NewsAndMedia/News/2015/Pages/30Mar_Tanzania.aspx (accessed 05 April 
2015). 
25 KPMG ‘Oil and Gas in Africa; Africa’s Reserves, Potential and Prospects’ (2013)17 available at 
https://www.kpmg.com/Africa/en/IssuesAndInsights/Articles-
Publications/Documents/Oil%20and%20Gas%20in%20Africa.pdf  (accessed 05 October 2014) 
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investment could be concentrated in the 2017-20 period, with Liquefied Natural Gas 
(LNG) production starting between 2020 and 2025 and extending over perhaps two 
decades. 
At a price of $10 per 1000 cubic feet in the Far East export market, Tanzania’s export 
earnings from gas could significantly exceed $3 billion annually. This is ten per cent 
of the 2012 gross domestic product.26Given that potential, it follows that Tanzania’s 
oil and gas sector should be attracting more investment. The only next question 
would be whether the legal and regulatory framework is couched in a manner that 
would guarantee a flow of FDI. 
1. 3.3 Prospects for oil discovery 
While there has been no oil discovered yet, prospects are that Tanzania may become 
the next oil producer. This is due to the country’s geographical location in relation to 
the East African Rift System (EARS). So far, oil has been discovered in Uganda’s 
Lake Albert and in northern Kenya.27 The relevance of this, according to Ridge, is 
that Tanzania contains both the western arm and the eastern arm of the EARS in 
Lake Tanganyika and in Pangani/Eyasi, 28respectively. 
1.4 Problem statement 
The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (CERDS) of 1964 provides that 
a State has the right to ‘regulate and exercise authority over foreign investment 
                                                          
26 KPMG ‘Oil and Gas in Africa; Africa’s Reserves, Potential and Prospects’ (2013) 17 available at 
https://www.kpmg.com/Africa/en/IssuesAndInsights/Articles-
Publications/Documents/Oil%20and%20Gas%20in%20Africa.pdf  (accessed 05 October 2014). Note that 
while oil prices have declined at the end of December 2014 up to March 2015, this has not at all 
affected gas prices. 
27Mugini J ‘Tanzania: with gas already in its bag Tanzania's Rift System set to become next oil frontier’ 
The Daily News 11 July 2014 available at http://allafrica.com/stories/201407110285.html(accessed 01 
October 2014). 
28Mugini J ‘Tanzania: with gas already in its bag Tanzania's Rift System set to become next oil frontier’ 
The Daily News 11 July 2014 available at http://allafrica.com/stories/201407110285.html(accessed 01 
October 2014). 
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within its national jurisdiction in accordance with its laws and regulations and in 
conformity with its national objectives and priorities.’29 
The 1992 World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of FDI stipulate in Article III(2) 
that, ‘each State will extend to investments established in its territory by nationals of 
any other State fair and equitable treatment according to the standards 
recommended in the Guidelines.’30 
The Southern Africa Development Community’s (SADC) Protocol on Finance and 
Investment provides that Member States of the SADC shall coordinate their 
investment regimes and co-operate to create a favourable investment climate within 
the region.31 Similarly, the Protocol provides that Member States of the SADC should 
promote entrepreneurship in industries that specifically attract Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI).32 Further, the Protocol directs Member States to collaboratively 
develop a framework for tax incentives that will draw FDI into the region.33 
Tanzania is a member of the SADC. Its core legal framework for upstream activities 
is governed by the PEP Act 27 of 1980.34 The Act is the basis for the grant of 
exploration and development licences for oil and gas. It spells out the broad terms 
and conditions of the licences and also vests petroleum resources in the 
government.35 
Given the fact that the Act was enacted more than 35 years ago, prior to major recent 
discoveries and developments, it has necessitated various further policy and legal 
enactments to fill the gap. Tanzania adopted a new gas policy in 2013.36 There was 
                                                          
29 Article 2 of the CERDS, 1964. 
30 Article III (2) of the World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment (1992). 
31 Article 3(1) of the SADC Protocol on Finance and Investment (2006). 
32 Article 3 of Annexure 1, the SADC Protocol on Finance and Investment (2006). 
33 Article 4 of Annexure 3, the SADC protocol on Finance and Investment (2006). 
34 Cap 328 RE 2002. 
35Kapinga W & Thorns A ‘Tanzania’  in Christopher B  (ed) The Oil and Gas Law Review (2013) Ch 19 
243-258.  
36 Ministry for Energy and Minerals The National Natural Gas Policy of Tanzania (2013). 
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the Petroleum Conservation Act of 198137 which was repealed and replaced by the 
Petroleum Act, 2008. The Petroleum Act of 2008 was enacted to make provision for 
the importation, exportation, transportation, transformation, storage and wholesale 
and retail distribution of petroleum products in a liberalised market, and to provide 
for related matters. 
Nevertheless, the PEP Act 27 of 198038 remains the main single piece of legislation 
that directly governs exploration for and production of oil and gas in Tanzania. 
There is a clear indication that some of the policies might necessitate some 
amendment to the PEP Act, especially the Petroleum Policy of 2014 which in its first 
draft already clearly calls for some reforms in the law generally, including the 
exploration and production law.39 
It is certain that none of the changes will totally repeal the PEP Act 27 of 1980, since 
even the proposed Gas Bill, is only going to apply to midstream and downstream 
activities, as opposed to upstream activities to which the PEP Act of 1980 applies.40 
It is because of this background, in addition to the other legal and regulatory 
frameworks in place, and with prospects of oil discovery, and further gas discovery 
and production, that there is a need to assess the ability of the PEP Act 27 of 1980 to 
effectively provide for an investor friendly framework for exploration and 
production of oil and gas. 
Central to this question is the ability of the Act to attract FDI and at the same time 
benefit the local population. It is important to analyse the way the Act is drafted to 
interlink with the whole legal framework in attracting FDI. Is Tanzania’s Petroleum 
                                                          
37Cap 392 RE 2002 
38 Cap 328 RE 2002. 
39 Ministry for Energy and Minerals The National Petroleum Policy of Tanzania- Draft 3 July 2014 (2014) 
29. 
40Kapinga W & Thorns A ‘Tanzania’  in Christopher B  (ed) The Oil and Gas Law Review (2013) Ch 19 
243-258. 
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(Exploration and Production) Act 27 of 198041 effective, or is it flawed, outdated and 
superseded by events, making it ineffective in attracting investments?  
1.5 Research questions 
The overarching question this study answers is: 
Does the existing law relating to exploration and production of oil and gas in 
Tanzania create a friendly FDI framework in the oil and gas sector, and 
guarantees its protection, or is it flawed, outdated and overtaken by events? 
In answering this broad question, an attempt is made to answer the following sub-
questions: 
a) What is the current law relating to exploration and production of oil and 
gas in Tanzania? 
b) Is the law framed in a manner that guarantees the protection of FDI? 
c) What are the emerging issues regarding local population benefits in the oil 
and gas investments? 
d) Whether the proposed reforms (if any) of the legal framework address the 
issue of local population benefits without threatening the protection of FDI? 
1.6 Objectives 
The objective of this study is to analyse the law relating to exploration and 
production of oil and gas in Tanzania in relation to the protection of FDI. The 
analysis will be based on the international standards for the protection of FDI. Some 
of these standards are contained in international instruments42 and some of them 
have attained the status of customary international law.43 Examples of such 
                                                          
41 Cap 328 RE 2002. 
42 OECD ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment (2004) Working Papers on 
International Investment Law 8 available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/675702255435(accessed 11 October 
2014). 
43OECD ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment (2004) Working Papers on 
International Investment Law 8 available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/675702255435(accessed 11 October 
2014). 
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standards include: Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET),44 Full Protection and Security 
(FPS),45 non-arbitrariness46 and non-discrimination, among others.47 Some 
international instruments to be referred to include the 1992 World Bank Guidelines 
on Treatment of FDI and the CERDS. 
1.7 Significance of the study 
The study comes at a point where Tanzania has prospects for the discovery of oil. 
Together with gas, which has already been discovered, it is poised to push the 
Tanzanian economy to the next level. FDI is indispensable for the country at the 
moment. This study will identify areas which need to be improved in order to tap 
FDI for the oil and gas sector. 
The study provides a fair assessment of the law and therefore presents an 
opportunity for policymakers to re-think reforms in the oil and gas sector with a 
view to creating a more investor friendly framework. 
For the international community, especially investors both existing and potential, the 
study will provide an understanding of the existing framework, and possible 
investment climate trends in the future. 
1.8 Proposed methodology 
The study analyses the law relating to exploration for, and production of oil and gas 
in Tanzania in relation to the protection of FDI.  It examines the existing Tanzanian 
law on oil and gas exploration, on the one hand, and the international minimum 
standards, on the other, as a comparator, in assessing the protection of FDI. As stated 
                                                          
44 Article 11(2) of the Havana Charter of 1948. Fair and Equitable Treatment was also discussed in 
Mondev International Ltd v United States of America (ICSID) unreported case no. ARB (AF)/99/2 (I 
October 2002). It was held that FET is customary international law and thus not a prerogative of a 
host State. 
45Sornarajah M The International Law on Foreign Investment 4 ed (2010) 349-359. 
46Sornarajah M The International Law on Foreign Investment 4 ed (2010) 349-359. 
47Sornarajah M The International Law on Foreign Investment 4 ed (2010) 349-359. 
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above, some of these standards are contained in international instruments48 and 
some of them have attained the status of customary international law.49 
This study specifically does not use the SADC Protocol on Finance and Investment 
of 2006 as a comparator because the Protocol only imposes an obligation on Member 
States to harmonise their domestic frameworks to create a regional investor friendly 
climate. It does not specifically provide for standards of protection of FDI. 
In addition, this is a desktop and library study. It relies on both published and 
unpublished materials, taking into account significant primary and secondary 
sources of information on the issue in addressing the research questions. Various 
Tanzanian Acts and policies relating to the subject matter are examined. 
The secondary sources of information include relevant journal articles, newspaper 
reports and publications, as well as position papers written by law firms. The study 
also relies heavily on Internet sources. Speeches and government press releases have 
also been considered. The study has adopted a descriptive, analytical and 
exploratory approach. The aim is to build on the existing literature and ongoing 
debate on the reform of the oil and gas legal framework reforms, particularly placing 
more emphasis on the impact it is likely to have on attracting and protecting existing 
and potential FDI. 
1.9 Scope and limitations of the study 
This study focuses specifically on the provisions of the law relating to exploration 
for, and production of oil and gas in Tanzania. It deals with the substantive and 
procedural framework that the law establishes and how it affects FDI. It does not 
analyse the whole legal framework of Tanzania. While it touches briefly on aspects 
                                                          
48 OECD ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment’ (2004) 3 Working Papers 
on International Investment Law 8 available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/675702255435(accessed 11 
October 2014). 
49OECD ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment (2004) 3 Working Papers 
on International Investment Law 8 available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/675702255435(accessed 11 
October 2014). 
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such as fiscal, regulatory and institutional, these will only be in relation to their 
interface with the upstream laws, and their impacts on FDI in oil and gas. 
Oil and gas is an infant industry in Tanzania. As such, there is little literature 
regarding the same. However some works have dealt with the analysis of the law on 
exploration and production of oil and gas, especially in relation to FDI. Furthermore, 
the oil and gas industry is also a sensitive sector; as a result, obtaining some 
information has proven to be a challenge, especially access to key contracts such as 
Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) which are deemed confidential in 
Tanzania.50 
 
1.10 Overview of chapters. 
a) Chapter One 
This chapter introduced the study. It further outlined the nature of the study, its 
significance and methodology. 
b) Chapter Two 
Chapter Two provides theoretical and conceptual framework of oil and gas law. 
Various aspects, such as, oil and gas as property under the law, ownership, and 
definitions, are covered in this chapter.  
c) Chapter Three 
Chapter Three provides a brief legal and regulatory framework governing 
investment in oil and gas exploration and production in Tanzania. It introduces the 
existing law and institutions governing upstream activities. In addition, this chapter 
analyses provisions of the Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act 27 of 198051 
in depth. It discusses the substantive and procedural framework that the Act lays 
                                                          
50  The Citizen Reporter ‘Investors accuse govt of keeping contracts secret’ The Citizen 21 September 
2014 available at http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/News/Investors-accuse-govt-of-keeping-contracts-secret/-
/1840392/2460416/-/item/0/-/10hp6iuz/-/index.html (accessed 11 October 2014). 
50 Cap 328 RE 2002. 
51 Cap 328 RE 2002. 
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down. It analyses how the Act is framed to interlink with, or to pave way for, other 
legal and regulatory frameworks governing oil and gas.  
d) Chapter Four 
This chapter introduces the international minimum standards for protection of FDI. 
Then it analyses the relationship between the Tanzanian law and protection of FDI 
in oil and gas using the international standards as enshrined in instruments such as 
the 1992 World Bank Guidelines on Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment. The 
chapter presents the challenges to, and achievements of, the Act during the 35 years 
that it has been in place. It also briefly analyses some of the proposals for reform. 
e) Chapter Five 
Chapter Five provides some concluding remarks derived from the analysis in the 
previous chapters. It finally makes a number of recommendations.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF OIL AND GAS 
INVESTMENT 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter identifies key concepts and theories in relation to investment in oil and 
gas exploration. The first part (2.2) revisits the meaning of oil and gas generally, and 
then under the Tanzanian law in part 2.2.1. Next, part 2.3 discusses oil and gas as 
property under international law, and the ownership of oil and gas as a natural 
resource. The following two parts, 2.4 and 2.5, respectively, revisit existing global 
models and theories of ownership and the allocation of rights in oil and gas. This is 
important to be put into perspective because it is ownership which gives rise to the 
power of allocation of rights, including investment, and of regulation of investments, 
in natural resources.  Finally, under part 2.6 the chapter attributes these world 
models to Tanzania and makes an analysis to determine which model the country 
has adopted. Summing up Chapter Two is part 2.7 which traces the historical 
development of the allocation of oil and gas rights in Tanzania, and the chapter 
concludes with a brief analysis summary. 
2.2 General definition of oil and gas 
The word ‘petroleum’ is derived from the Latin ‘petra’ (which means rock) and 
oleum (which means oil).52 It is commonly used to refer to crude oil, but it may also 
refer to other related hydrocarbons such as methane which is natural gas.53  In this 
thesis, the terms oil and gas are used interchangeably with petroleum. Likewise, 
petroleum shall be used to mean both oil54 and gas. The reason for this is that 
according to experts, petroleum is a term that refers to both crude oil and 
                                                          
52 OPEC I need to know: An introduction to the Oil Industry & OPEC 2 ed (2013) 12. 
53 OPEC I need to know: An introduction to the Oil Industry & OPEC 2 ed (2013) 12.  
54Oil in this sense can be crude oil or refined oil. Crude oil refers to the raw liquid form of extracted 
hydrocarbons, which is not yet refined to remove other impurities, such as, oxygen, sulphur, nitrogen 
and heavy metal atoms. Simply put, the form of oil as extracted, before any processes to transform it 
into refined oil for ordinary consumption. See further: OPEC I need to know: An introduction to the Oil 
Industry & OPEC 2 ed (2013) 12.  
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gas.55Another reason is that, as shown in the next part (2.2.1), in Tanzania the law 
applicable to the exploration and production of oil and gas is one and the same, and 
defines petroleum to mean both oil and gas. However, it is important to take into 
account that up until the writing of this thesis, petroleum in the strict sense of crude 
oil has not been discovered yet in Tanzania. However, hydrocarbons in the form of 
natural gas have already been discovered and production is already ongoing as 
indicated in chapter one. 
For her part, Omorogbe describes petroleum as a mixture of hydro and carbon 
(hydrocarbon) that occurs under the earth surface primarily within the pore spaces 
of sedimentary rocks, in liquid, gaseous or solid forms.56  When it is found as a solid, 
it is coal, shale, tar sands or bitumen. When these hydrocarbons are found in liquid 
form, they are crude oil. On the other hand, when found in gaseous form such as 
methane, it is the natural gas.57There is literature that mentions petroleum with 
reference to the latter (crude oil).58 
2.2.1 Definition of oil and gas under Tanzanian law 
There has been a statutory definition of petroleum under the Petroleum (Exploration 
and Production) Act 27 of 1980 (PEP Act). The Act provides under section 5 that 
petroleum means; 
 ‘(a) any naturally occurring hydrocarbon, whether in gaseous, liquid 
or solid state;(b) any naturally occurring mixture of hydrocarbons, 
whether in gaseous, liquids, or solid state; or(c) any naturally 
occurring mixture of one more hydrocarbons whether in a gaseous, 
                                                          
55 OPEC I need to know: An introduction to the Oil Industry & OPEC 2 ed (2013) 12.  
 
56Omorogbe Y The Oil and Gas Industry: Exploration and Production Contracts (1997) 5. 
57 OPEC I need to know: An introduction to the Oil Industry & OPEC 2 ed (2013) 12. 
58For instance Ojuokaiye defines petroleum in reference to the liquid form of the hydrocarbons, 
‘Petroleum or crude oil is a naturally occurring, toxic, flammable liquid consisting of a complex 
mixture of hydrocarbons of various molecular weights, and other organic compounds that are found 
in geologic formations beneath the earth's surface.’ See: Ojuokaiye O ‘Oil and Gas Law’ (2011) National 
Open University of Nigeria 19. 
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liquid, or solid state and any other substance, and includes any 
petroleum as defined by paragraph (a), (b) or (c) that has been 
returned to a natural reservoir, but does not include coal, or any 
substance that may be extracted from coal, or other rock.’ 
From the above, it appears that the PEP Act gives a broad definition of petroleum, 
probably to incorporate the diverse technical composition of petroleum as explained 
in part 2.2 above. There has been criticism, however, that there needs to be a specific 
and separate definition of gas as a separate subject matter, if not enacting legislation 
specifically for gas.59 However, it would appear that a few other countries have 
followed this inclusive definition approach, including Nigeria.60 However, unlike 
Tanzania, Nigeria’s legislation in addition to defining petroleum broadly, 
specifically defines natural gas. The Petroleum Act of Nigeria provides that 
petroleum means ‘mineral oil (or any other related hydrocarbon) or natural gas as it 
exists in its natural state in strata, and it does not include coal or bituminous shales 
or other stratified deposits from which oil can be extracted by destructive 
distillation.’ Furthermore, crude oil is defined in the Nigerian Act as ‘oil in its 
natural state before it has been refined or treated (excluding water and other foreign 
substances).’61 
From these definitions and descriptions of petroleum, it can be said that the term 
petroleum includes (crude) oil and natural gas, while both oil and gas have similar 
qualities but are not the same in many of their components.  
Finally, as stated in part 2.2 in this study, the terms ‘petroleum’ and ‘oil and gas’ are 
used interchangeably in this thesis too. However, predominantly, reference is made 
to gas, because, first, oil in its strict definition as crude oil has not been discovered 
                                                          
59Ngowi J ‘Developing a legal framework for Tanzania’s natural gas sector’ available at 
http://www.ealawchambers.com/News-Blog/Blog/Tanzania-Natural-Gas-Discovery(accessed 03 November 
2014). 
60Ojuokaiye O ‘Oil and Gas Law’ (2011) National Open University of Nigeria 19. 
61Ojuokaiye O ‘Oil and Gas Law’ (2011) National Open University of Nigeria 19. 
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yet in Tanzania despite increasing prospects, and secondly, and most importantly, 
the law governing petroleum and gas exploration and production is one and the 
same. 
2.3 Oil and gas as property under international law 
2.3.1 Ownership and control of oil and gas 
Ownership rights over oil and gas take various forms and vary from one country to 
another. The forms are said to depend on countries’ social-political and historical 
backgrounds, and furthermore, their legal systems, and in particular, the laws, 
which directly impact on the oil and gas industry and the various contracts between 
companies.62 
As said above under section 2.1, the essence therefore of discussing ownership lies in 
the fact that a legal or regulatory regime provides the rules and procedures 
governing the allocation, maintenance, transfer and cancellation of oil and gas rights.  
These also determine forms and rules regulating investments. 
2.3.2 The legal concept of ownership of oil and gas in international law 
When it comes to ownership of oil and gas the question is always whether private 
individuals can own the resources or whether they are vested in the sovereign. Legal 
ownership of natural resources is governed by multiple legal frameworks ranging 
from international to domestic.63 The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) 
Resolution 1803 of 1962 provides that ‘the right of the peoples and nations to the 
permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources must be exercised in 
the interest of their national development and of the wellbeing of the people of the 
                                                          
62Omorogbe Y &Oniemola P ‘Property Rights in Oil and Gas under Domanial Regimes’ in McHarg A 
et al (eds) Property and the Law in Energy and Natural Resources (2010) 115-139. 
63Iwere O ‘What effect does the ownership of resources by the Government have on its people: a case 
study of Nigeria?’ available at http://www.dundee.ac.uk%2fcepmlp%2fgateway%2ffiles.php%3ffile%3dcar-
11_37_844417759.pdf&ei=x6zwvj3qmmjjo8clgbgh&usg=afqjcnfdspa8ldtie3qhwac1ngto8s8ygw&sig2=ewoa39f
pqjl_rdeezc-nbq/ (accessed 03 November 2014). 
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state concerned.’64  Likewise, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 
provided under Article 2: 
 ‘States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and 
the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their 
own resources pursuant to their own environmental and developmental 
policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their 
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other 
States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.’65 
Arguably, the various provisions in international instruments do not encroach on the 
sovereign powers of States to mandate municipal forms of ownership of natural 
resources. They also do not, by implication, remove the possibility of a private 
ownership model of natural resources, such as, oil and gas. There have existed, as a 
result, multiple international legal theories regarding the ownership of oil and gas. 
2.4 General ownership theories relating to oil and gas 
There exist three theories under international law regarding the ownership of 
natural resources, such as, minerals, oil and gas. These theories, namely, the national 
ownership theory, the absolute ownership theory, and the qualified ownership 
theory, all revolve around the issue whether the natural resources belong to the State 
or individuals occupying the area in which the resources are found. In addition, 
there is the question whether the rights automatically belong to the occupiers or the 
sovereign.  
The next part analyses these three theories in relation to the upstream sector. The 
need to expound these theories stems from the fact that they determine, in countries 
where they are applicable, the legal and constitutional rules that deal with natural 
resources’ tenure, acquisition, holding, transfer, and termination of rights. 
                                                          
64 The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 1803 of 1962. 
65 The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development of 1992. 
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2.4.1 The national ownership theory, also known as the ‘domanial system’ 
The national ownership theory is also known as the ‘domanial system.’ This system 
is one that assigns rights over natural resources to the State.66  The theory provides 
for the vesting of ownership rights in the sovereign. This is the most prevalent 
system of ownership of minerals. Only a few countries, including the United States 
(US), are cited as not having adopted this model.67  Many others retain sovereign 
rights over all mineral deposits, including oil and gas. In many of these countries 
this right is enshrined in legislation and the constitution.68 The theory advocates the 
vesting of complete and total ownership of petroleum resources in the government 
of the State. Some authors argue that this is an effective theory in terms of attracting 
foreign direct investment for countries. Countries, such as, Nigeria, South Africa, 
Bolivia, Venezuela and China, utilise the national ownership theory.69Tanzania 
follows this approach too. A detailed explanation of Tanzania’s approach is 
provided in part 2.6 of this chapter. 
The ‘domanial system’, as it is referred today, is said to trace its origins from the 
Roman law. It was first known as the ‘regalian system’ until after the Second Punic 
War whereby the Roman Empire became the owner of all conquered lands.70 Mineral 
resources came under the ownership of the sovereign, represented by the relevant 
political authority, which granted permits, licences and leases for exploration and 
exploitation of mineral resources. According to this system, the ‘dominium 
                                                          
66 Wieland P ‘Going beyond panaceas: Escaping  Mining conflicts in  Resource -Rich countries 
through Middle -ground policies’ (2013) available at http://www.nyuelj.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/09/Wieland-for-Printer2.pdf (accessed 19 January 2015). 
67 Wieland P ‘Going beyond panaceas: Escaping  Mining conflicts in  Resource -Rich countries 
Through Middle-ground policies’ (2013) available at http://www.nyuelj.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/09/Wieland-for-Printer2.pdf (accessed 19 January 2015). 
68See for instance Article 14 of the Basic Law of Governance 1992 of Saudi Arabia (Royal Order No 
A/91); Article 6 of the Petroleum Law No. 3/ 2001 of Mozambique; Section 44 (3) of the Constitution of 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria of 1999 and Article 21 of the Constitution of Kuwait 1962. 
69Iwere O ‘What effect does the ownership of resources by the Government have on its people: a case 
study of Nigeria?’ available at http://www.dundee.ac.uk%2fcepmlp%2fgateway%2ffiles.php%3ffile%3dcar-
11_37_844417759.pdf&ei=x6zwvj3qmmjjo8clgbgh&usg=afqjcnfdspa8ldtie3qhwac1ngto8s8ygw&sig2=ewoa39f
pqjl_rdeezc-nbq/ (accessed 03 November 2014).  
70Omorogbe Y & Oniemola P ‘Property Rights in Oil and Gas under Domanial Regimes’ in McHarg A 
et al (eds) Property and the Law in Energy and Natural Resources (2010) 115-139. 
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directum’ (the dominion of the soil) was vested immediately either in the crown, or 
in the feudal landlords and was separated from the dominium utile (the possessory 
title), the right to use and profit from the soil.71 
Further, according to the domanial law system, the State vests mineral resources in 
itself while the landowners only have a right of compensation for the loss of surface 
rights.72 
2.4.2 Absolute ownership theory 
Unlike the national ownership theory, this theory recognises private ownership of 
oil and gas.73 An analogy can be drawn between this theory and the popular land 
theory titled ‘quicquid plantatur solo, solo cedit,’ which means that he, who owns land, 
owns that beneath it. In other words, under the absolute ownership theory, the 
owner of a piece of land owns the oil beneath it.74The principle has had long judicial 
recognition in some countries as well as some states in the US.  In the case of Mitchell 
v Mosley (1914) 1 Ch 438 the Court held that ‘the grant of the land includes the 
surface and all that is supra – houses, trees, and the like  .... And all that is infra, i.e. 
mines earth, clay & co …’75Under the private ownership system, the landowner is 
vested with discretion and powers to decide what to do with the resources, 
including whether or not to exploit them. It is up to them to decide whether to ‘leave 
resources unexploited, extract resources themselves, or grant mining rights to third 
parties through a lease or a sale of a mineral interest.’76 
                                                          
71Omorogbe Y &Oniemola P ‘Property Rights in Oil and Gas under Domanial Regimes’ in McHarg A 
et al (eds) Property and the Law in Energy and Natural Resources (2010) 115-139 
72Omorogbe Y &Oniemola P ‘Property Rights in Oil and Gas under Domanial Regimes’ in McHarg A 
et al (eds) Property and the Law in Energy and Natural Resources (2010) 115-139 
73Iwere O ‘What effect does the ownership of resources by the Government have on its people: a case 
study of Nigeria?’ available at http://www.dundee.ac.uk%2fcepmlp%2fgateway%2ffiles.php%3ffile%3dcar-
11_37_844417759.pdf&ei=x6zwvj3qmmjjo8clgbgh&usg=afqjcnfdspa8ldtie3qhwac1ngto8s8ygw&sig2=ewoa39f
pqjl_rdeezc-nbq/ (accessed 03 November 2014).   
74Sprankling JG ‘Owning the Centre of the Earth’ (2008) 55 UCLA Law Review 979. 
75Mitchell v Mosley (1914) 1 Ch 438. 
76 Wieland P ‘Going beyond panaceas: Escaping  Mining conflicts in  Resource -Rich countries 
Through Middle -Ground policies’ (2013) available at http://www.nyuelj.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/09/Wieland-for-Printer2.pdf (accessed 19 January 2015). 
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The theory of absolute ownership is not short of criticisms, too. For example, oil and 
gas are extracted from hydrocarbon, which is vagrant in nature and straddles 
different pieces of land. Hence, in such cases it is difficult to place ownership onto a 
person.  
The other drawback is the fact that oil and gas deposits are also found offshore and 
onshore, such as in continental shelves or exclusive economic zones (EEZ) 
exclusively owned by States as per the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea of 1982.77 Hence, it defeats the possibility for private ownership of oil and gas 
deposits in such areas. 
2.4.3 Qualified ownership theory or ‘rule of capture’ 
This theory came about as a result of the inherent shortcomings of the absolute 
ownership theory. As stated above in 2.4.2, oil and gas are fugacious resources. 
Therefore, as Wieland78 puts it, depending on the subsurface pressures, oil viscosity, 
and porosity of the rock, they tend to migrate rapidly toward the low pressure area 
generated by the puncture of the well bore.  
This migration allows adjacent landowners to extract what would be their 
neighbour’s oil under the ‘absolute ownership’ theory.79 Therefore, courts in the US 
stated that property rights in oil and gas are acquired only by capture, that is, by 
removing them from the ground and thus converting them into personal property. 
Ultimately, oil and gas belong to the person who recovers them first by drilling on 
his land, even if that oil and gas may have ‘migrated’ from under adjoining lands. 
The courts in the US have recognised that the landowner is privileged to sink as 
many wells as he desires upon his tract of land and extract therefrom and 
                                                          
77Iwere O ‘What effect does the ownership of resources by the Government have on its people: a case 
study of Nigeria?’ available at http://www.dundee.ac.uk%2fcepmlp%2fgateway%2ffiles.php%3ffile%3dcar-
11_37_844417759.pdf&ei=x6zwvj3qmmjjo8clgbgh&usg=afqjcnfdspa8ldtie3qhwac1ngto8s8ygw&sig2=ewoa39f
pqjl_rdeezc-nbq/(accessed 03 November 2014).   
78 Wieland P ‘Going beyond panaceas: Escaping  Mining conflicts in  Resource -Rich countries 
Through Middle -Ground policies’ (2013) available at http://www.nyuelj.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/09/Wieland-for-Printer2.pdf (accessed 19 January 2015). 
79Daintith T Finder’s keepers? How the law of capture shaped the world oil industry (2010) 35. 
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appropriate all the oil and gas that he may produce.80 This helps somehow to shield 
landowners from liability arising out of alleged wrongful taking of oil and gas. 
However, authors have observed that the rule of capture is being watered down 
over the years by various regulations such as those that seek to promote efficiency, 
like limiting well drilling. This is so because otherwise the rule of capture would 
have led, and it did lead already in some parts, to a drilling race, overproduction, 
depletion of reserves and other inefficiencies.  
2.4.4 Principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources 
The principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources was stated and 
adopted in the UN General Assembly Resolution 3281 (XX1X), which is  referred to 
as the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (CERDS), of 12 December 
1974. The principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources had been also 
stated, although not in exact wording, in resolutions prior to the CERDS, such as, 
Resolution No 2158 (XX1) and Resolution 1803 of 1962. The Organisation of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)81 has also insisted, through various policies, 
on control over oil resources.82 In 1968, OPEC issued Resolution XVI.90 which was 
titled ‘Declaratory Statement of Petroleum Policy in Member Countries.’83According 
to Omorogbe and Oniemola, this Resolution required Member States to be involved 
in direct development of their resources or take  measures for participation in and 
control over all aspects of resources operations where they cannot be directly 
involved in such direct development. Other steps to be taken included the review of 
                                                          
80Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co. (1948) 210 S.W.2d 558. 
81 OPEC’s mandate is to coordinate and unify the petroleum policies of its members and to ensure the 
stabilisation of oil markets in order to secure an efficient, economic and regular supply of petroleum 
to consumers, a steady income to producers, and a fair return on capital for those investing in the 
petroleum industry. See generally; Kyepa D The World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the Organisation 
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Mandates: Regulating Production Quotas, Subsidies, and 
Corruption in Oil Producing Countries-an African Perspective (unpublished LLD thesis, University of the 
Western Cape, 2014). 
82Omorogbe Y & Oniemola P ‘Property Rights in Oil and Gas under Domanial Regimes’ in McHarg A 
et al (eds) Property and the Law in Energy and Natural Resources (2010) 115-139. 
83Cuervo L ‘OPEC from Myth to Reality’ (2008)30 Houston Journal of International Law available at 
http://international.vlex.com/vid/opec-from-myth-to-reality-55460892 (accessed 03 November 2014). 
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existing concession contracts, the relinquishment of existing concession contracts 
and the determination of oil pricing by Member States.84 
From the foregoing, it is clear that oil and gas can be privately owned or can be 
retained as a sovereign property. Either way, both under private ownership or 
sovereign ownership, exploration and production rights can be further granted to 
other parties in preferred different forms, such as, concessions, service or production 
sharing agreements.  
The following part (2.5) discusses the various forms of allocation of oil and gas 
exploration and production rights. Thereafter, part 2.6 discusses the form of granting 
exploration rights preferred by Tanzania as per the existing legal framework and 
practice in the country.   
2.5 General global forms of allocation of oil and gas rights 
Where States exercise exclusive rights over resources, such as petroleum, as under 
the domanial regime,85 the sovereign grants rights for exploration and production of 
the State owned oil and gas to public or private entities.  On the other hand, even in 
private ownership of resources, owners tend to forge different agreements for 
exploration and production of oil and gas resources. These rights can be granted to 
companies under licences or leases, or contractual arrangements.  Contractual 
arrangements include partnerships, joint ventures, and production sharing 
agreements, concessions and service agreements. Where ownership is vested on the 
State, the powers are exercised by a designated head of State or minister in 
accordance with the law in force. 
As indicated in the above paragraph, historically there have emerged different types 
of oil and gas contracts. However, when it comes to oil and gas exploration and 
                                                          
84Omorogbe Y & Oniemola P ‘Property Rights in Oil and Gas under Domanial Regimes’ in McHarg A et al 
(eds) Property and the Law in Energy and Natural Resources (2010) 115-139. 
85 In other regimes where private individual forms of ownership are recognised, it follows that the 
individuals owning the resources have exclusive rights over their portions. They likewise enter into 
forms of agreements to grant the rights further to other entities depending on their need and 
capacities to explore and produce.  
 
 
 
 
23 
 
production, there have existed three common86 contracts, namely, concession 
agreements, production sharing agreements (PSAs), and service contracts.87The 
discussion below analyses the three peculiar contractual arrangements in the oil and 
gas sector. These are concession agreements, PSAs and service contracts.  The 
discussion specifically leaves out partnerships and joint ventures as these aren’t 
exclusive to the oil and gas sector, and are governed by general contract law. On the 
contrary, concessions, PSAs and service contracts have peculiar features which are 
discussed below. 
2.5.1 Concession agreements 
Concessions are believed to be the earliest form of arrangement, and did not apply to 
oil and gas alone but to all other natural resources.88 Concessions were granted by 
the host government to the owner of the land surface rights for the purposes of 
exploring and producing petroleum from the concession.  In return for the right to 
exploit the concession the holder of the land surface right was obliged to pay a 
royalty.89 Concessions were granted largely in the States where resources were 
vested in the sovereign or government, such as the continental civil law systems of 
Europe, Latin and South America, and the Middle East.90 Authors agree that early 
concessions lasted for long periods of time. The most cited example in the literature 
is the concession which was granted on 28th May 1901 by the Persian government to 
William Knox D’Arcy to carry out petroleum exploration and production 
throughout Persia, and was valid for a period of sixty years.91 In return D’Arcy was 
                                                          
86 Other forms may include joint ventures or partnerships, but are not discussed herein as they 
generally follow the general contract law requirements. 
87Ghadas Z ‘Types and Features of International Petroleum Contracts’ (2014) 3 Kuala Lumpur 
International Business, Economics and Law Conference57-68. 
88Nakhle C ‘Petroleum Fiscal regimes: evolution and challenges’ in Daniel P et al (eds.) The Taxation of 
Petroleum Minerals (2010) 32. 
89Ikenna NE ‘International Petroleum Law: Has it Emerged as a distinct Legal Discipline?’ (1996) 8 
African Journal of International Comparative Law 434. 
90Mgaya R Petroleum Taxation: A Critical Analysis of Oil and Gas Fiscal Regime in Tanzania (unpublished 
Msc thesis, University of Robert Gordon, 2014) 16. 
91Yergin D The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power (2008) 45. 
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obliged to pay bonuses to the government and 16 per cent of the company’s annual 
profit.92 
The main characteristic of the concession system is that the international oil 
company (IOC) acquires title to petroleum produced at the wellhead and the oil 
company has to pay royalty and tax only to the host government. The contractor also 
owns assets and the government or its agents do not monitor operations and 
expenditure unless the oil company defaults on the payment of taxes.93 The IOC has 
the right to own the produced petroleum except that it may be required to supply 
local markets.94 Unlike the old concessions, modern concessions consists for short-
term periods, and the State has greater control over resource and project 
management. Modern concessions also comprise various taxes including bonuses, a 
royalty, income tax and additional profit tax.95 
The concession agreements gradually paved the way for other evolving modes of 
exploration and production arrangements. Various reasons are cited for the demise 
of the concessionary systems, among which are revenue conflicts between investing 
IOCs and host countries, the rise of crude oil prices in the 1970s, formation of the 
OPEC, and the emergence of State oil companies.96 
2.5.2 Service contracts 
Under a service contract the IOC explores for and produces petroleum on behalf of 
the government and is paid a fee for its services, with a possible right to buy a 
portion of the production.97Guirauden described a service contract as ‘a contract by 
                                                          
92Mgaya R Petroleum Taxation: A Critical Analysis of Oil and Gas Fiscal Regime in Tanzania (unpublished 
MSc. thesis, University of Robert Gordon, 2014) 16. 
93 Johnston D International Petroleum Fiscal Systems and Production-Sharing Contracts (1994) 23. 
94Tienhaara K ‘Foreign Investment Contracts in the Oil & Gas Sector: A Survey of Environmentally 
Relevant Clauses’ (2011) 11 Sustainable Development Law & Policy 15-20. 
95Ghadas Z ‘Types and Features of International Petroleum Contracts’ (2014) 3 Kuala Lumpur 
International Business, Economics and Law Conference 57-68. 
96Mgaya R Petroleum Taxation: A Critical Analysis of Oil and Gas Fiscal Regime in Tanzania (unpublished 
MSc thesis, University of Robert Gordon, 2014) 16. 
97Tienhaara K ‘Foreign Investment Contracts in the Oil & Gas Sector: A Survey of Environmentally 
Relevant Clauses’ (2011) 11 Sustainable Development Law & Policy 15. 
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which a contractor who is an IOC undertakes to explore for hydrocarbons at his own 
risk and expense on behalf of a national oil company (NOC), and by which he is 
reimbursed and remunerated in cash depending on the success of the exploration.’98 
The main distinction between a service contract and a PSA is that the service contract 
reimburses the contractor in cash, not in crude oil. The contractor will be paid a cash 
payment for carrying out the service of producing the petroleum resources. While all 
production vests in the host State, the contractor (IOC) is required to provide all the 
capital that is necessary for the exploration and development. 99 If the exploration 
efforts were successful, then the contractor recovers the costs through a fee that is 
based on a percentage of the produced oil. The host State is an owner of the 
resources and the international oil company acts as a contractor for a national oil 
company.100 
2.5.3 Production sharing agreements (PSAs) 
PSAs are also referred to as production sharing contracts (PSCs).  For avoidance of 
doubt, this thesis uses the term PSA. Under PSAs, an IOC can acquire oil rights for 
exploration and production through agreement with the State. PSAs are 
characterised by the following features. 
The host State signs up an IOC as a contractor through its enterprises, the national 
oil company (NOC) or Ministry of Oil.101 Ownership of resources is retained by the 
host State and concession are not granted to the IOCs. The IOCs are not liable for any 
related compensation, such as, surface and or proportional royalties, and have no 
ownership of the petroleum production, but are only allocated the cost of the oil and 
                                                          
98Ghadas Z ‘Types and Features of International Petroleum Contracts’ (2014) 3 Kuala Lumpur 
International Business, Economics and Law Conference57. 
99 Johnston D International Petroleum Fiscal Systems and Production-Sharing Contracts (1994) 12 
100Ghadas Z ‘Types and Features of International Petroleum Contracts’ (2014) 3 Kuala Lumpur 
International Business, Economics and Law Conference 57. 
101Ghadas Z ‘Types and Features of International Petroleum Contracts’ (2014) 3 Kuala Lumpur 
International Business, Economics and Law Conference 57. 
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the profit from the oil (See PSA flow chart on page 27) at an agreed location point, 
usually the connection point between storage and loading facilities. 
In a PSA the IOC bears the risks of exploration and is often in charge of the 
operations in, and management of, the contract area. Where oil is discovered in 
commercial quantities, the IOC is entitled to recoup its investment from the crude oil 
produced from the contract area. A PSA allows a contractor a quantity of oil to 
ensure an adequate return on investment and the contractor can dispose of oil to 
meet its tax and royalty obligations. The portion of oil meant for recouping is called 
cost recovery, and is normally about 20 to 50 per cent, although it could go even as 
high as 100 per cent.102The remainder is shared between the national oil company 
(NOC) and the IOC in predetermined portions. The contractor may be allowed to 
export freely its cost recovery oil and its share of profit oil, however subject to 
certain restrictions which may exist, such as the right of the host State to purchase at 
the market price.103 
The following chart on page 27 summarises how a PSA generally operates as 
discussed in the above paragraph. In summary, the NOC and the IOC enter into an 
oil exploration and production agreement where each party participates to the extent 
they agree in terms of resources and sharing of production.  Following gross 
production of oil, the royalty which goes to the State is deducted.  Then the IOC 
recoups its costs of production in the form of oil (called ‘cost oil’) from the remaining 
oil, based on computations agreed in the respective PSA.  The remaining oil is 
deemed to be profit and is therefore split between the IOC and the NOC based on 
formulas agreed upon and contribution. The IOC is further subject to taxes, such as 
income tax. 
  
                                                          
102Ghadas Z ‘Types and Features of International Petroleum Contracts’ (2014) 3 Kuala Lumpur 
International Business, Economics and Law Conference 57. 
103Taverne B Petroleum, Industry and Governments: A study of the involvement of industry and governments 
in the Production and use of Petroleum 2 ed (2008) 120. 
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PSA Flow Chart104 
 
 
 
The advantage of PSAs, which may also account for their rationale, is that they do 
not involve the surrender of the host country’s sovereignty in title to the resources; 
rather an IOC attains an interest in the oil, which is less than ownership thereof. 
There’s some slight similarity however between PSAs and service agreements. In 
both PSAs and service agreements, the host governments’ interests are in many cases 
represented by the NOC. Both contain provisions to secure the interests of local 
populations in terms of employment and other local content requirements. 
Nonetheless, the difference lies in the essence that in a PSA the IOC is more of a 
partner in the operations and control of the shares and venture, whereas in service 
agreements the IOC is more of a service contractor who is paid for services rendered.  
                                                          
104The chart is drawn based on my impression of the general PSA structure. It draws upon aspects 
from Bindemann K ‘Production-Sharing Agreements: An Economic Analysis’ (1999) Oxford Institute 
for Energy Studies WPM 13 and also,  Kabwe Z ‘Oil and Gas: Fiscal Challenges of Tanzania’s  
Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs)’ available at http://www.thecitizen.co.tz/blob/view/-
/2433654/data/818204/-/1228y5ez/-/ZITTO-PSA-OIL.pdf.  
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The discussion above highlights the different ways that States allocate oil and gas 
exploration and production rights. A crucial role is the State’s approach to the 
resources: whether it vests all the resources in itself or whether it recognises private 
ownership. It can be reasoned, that the choice between concessions, service contracts 
and PSAs can also be influenced by many factors including whether the country is a 
newcomer in the industry, hence would like to attract FDI through concessions, or 
whether the country wants to actively take part in exploration and production, in 
which case it will employ PSAs and enhance its technical know-how and capital 
base. 
2.6 Ownership and control of oil and gas rights in Tanzania 
This part identifies the ownership theory Tanzania has adopted for the oil and gas 
reserves. Secondly, it analyses the various forms of allocation of rights explained 
above in part 2.5 as they have historically been applied in Tanzania to date. 
2.6.1 Tanzania’s ‘domanial’ regime of ownership of oil and gas 
Tanzania seems to be following the national ownership theory in respect of oil and 
gas resources. The law provides that ‘the entire property in and control over 
petroleum in any land to which this Act applies are vested in the United Republic; 
but without prejudice to any right to explore for or produce petroleum granted, 
conferred, acquired or saved by or under this Act.’105 
This position is not a new development as this is an extension of the prevalent spirit 
of the laws which can be traced back to long before the enactment of the PEP Act in 
1980. The former land ordinance which was enacted during the British colonial rule 
made all land in Tanzania public land vested in the Crown. The most recent Land 
Act 4 of 1999 retained the position by stating that all land in Tanzania is public land 
and is vested in the President as a trustee for and on behalf of all Tanzanians.106  An 
interesting observation is that even the term ‘land’ itself is defined under the Land 
                                                          
105 Section 4 of PEP Act 2002. 
106 Section 4(1) of the Land Act 4 of 1999 (Cap 113 RE 2002). 
 
 
 
 
29 
 
Act in a manner that excludes natural resources so as to exclude them from the 
interests an individual can claim to have acquired by virtue of owning or acquiring 
land rights.  The interpretation section of the Land Act provides that land includes; 
‘the surface of the earth and the earth below the surface and all substances 
other than minerals or petroleum forming part of or below the surface, 
things naturally growing on the land, buildings and other structures 
permanently affixed to or under land and land covered by water prevalent 
and would seem to be applicable even in other forms of natural resources 
such as minerals.’107 
Further, Tanzania has asserted its rights over the continental shelf up to 200 nautical 
miles in accordance with the Law of the Sea Convention.108  Currently it is seeking to 
further extend this zone for the further allowed 150 miles called the Extended 
Continental Shelf (ECS), beyond the 200 nautical miles provided for in the 
Convention on the Law of the Sea.109 This can be interpreted as a quest to further 
increase the country’s area for exploration, since oil and gas reserves are found both 
onshore and offshore.  
                                                          
107 Section 2 of the Land Act 4 of 1999. 
108Tanzania seeks to extend exclusive economic zone’ The Guardian 17 January 2012 available at 
http://www.ippmedia.com/frontend/index.php?l=37546 (accessed 16 November 2014). 
109Tanzania seeks to extend exclusive economic zone’ The Guardian 17 January 2012 available at 
http://www.ippmedia.com/frontend/index.php?l=37546 (accessed 16 November 2014). 
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Prof. Anna Tibaijuka, the Minister for Lands, Housing and Human Settlements 
Development, at the time, was quoted as saying, in support of the ECS, that, ‘the 
seabed is an area of massive natural resources, including petroleum and gas, the 
exploitation of which should respect national boundaries. What we are doing is 
actually for the interests of the present and future generations’110 
The good thing about this legal position is that it ties in with the national ownership 
theory, making it practicable to vest all the resources in Tanzania in the State. 
Secondly, it affords the State the right to step in anytime a resource is discovered 
because essentially, any such resource whether discovered or not belongs to the 
State. The only shortcoming would relate to this second aspect as it means that the 
government has a walk-in right and therefore private interests over the land under 
which resources are found can easily be interfered with. 
2.7 Historical development of allocation of oil and gas rights in Tanzania 
Tanzania is currently using the PSA model to grant exploration and production 
rights for oil and gas. However, historically, the country has gone through several 
forms such as concessions and service agreements, before finally settling for PSAs. 
Together with the PEP Act, PSAs provide for standards and terms under which 
exploration and production of oil and gas can be conducted by the IOC. The 
following part identifies the concessions, service contracts and PSAs the country has 
entered into since the commencement of exploration and production in the country. 
2.7.1 Concession agreements 
Tanzania first adopted concession agreements, whereby during the first phase of 
exploration history in 1952-1964 British Petroleum (BP) and Shell were awarded 
concessions along the coast of Tanzania (then Tanganyika) including the islands of 
Unguja, Pemba and Mafia.111 These agreements were entered into based on the 
                                                          
110Munyanga M ‘Tanzania seeks extension of its continental shelf’ EANA 17 January 2012 available at 
http://eananews.org/1701121.htm (accessed 16 November 2014). 
111Mgaya R Petroleum Taxation: A Critical Analysis of Oil and Gas Fiscal Regime in Tanzania (unpublished 
MSc. thesis, University of Robert Gordon, 2014). 
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Mining (Mineral Oil) Ordinance.112  This Act was later repealed and replaced by the 
Petroleum (Exploration &Production) Act 27 of 1980, which is still the governing Act 
to date. BP and Shell held exploration acreage along the Coastal Basin including the 
islands of Zanzibar, Pemba and Mafia. The licensees carried out geological and 
geophysical surveys which however did not lead to any commercial discoveries.  
The concession agreements were therefore relinquished in 1964.113 
As explained in depth in Chapter One, the relinquishment of concessions granted to 
BP led to other IOCs, such as Azienda Generale Italiana Petroli (AGIP) Spa which 
succeeded BP and Shell. 
2.7.2 Service agreements 
Then, based on the same Act, AGIP Spa negotiated a service agreement with the 
government for the same whole area relinquished by BP/Shell.114  AGIP started 
operations in 1969. The same year, the Tanzania Petroleum Development 
Corporation (TPDC) was formed to oversee AGIP’s operations.  This necessitated the 
amendment of the agreement between AGIP and the government so as to 
accommodate the TPDC through a PSA. It was the first PSA and marked the 
beginning of the current PSAs system. AGIP made its first discovery in 1973. 
2.7.3 Production sharing agreements 
There was an increase in oil and gas exploration activities in the period between 1980 
and 1991and this is attributed to the increase in the oil price and the enactment of the 
                                                          
112Cap 399 RE 2002. 
113Ledesma D, ‘East Africa Gas-Potential for Export’ (2013) The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies  
available at 
http://www.google.co.za/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CCYQFjAB&url=http%3A%2
F%2Fwww.oxfordenergy.org%2Fwpcms%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2013%2F03%2FNG-
74.pdf&ei=YONoVJiFOaT9sATunYLABw&usg=AFQjCNEoWDKnJAu4gt9-1uTZUNZsPm7f-
A&bvm=bv.79142246,d.cWc  (accessed 16 November 2014). 
114Kilaghane Y ‘Tanzania’s Model Production Sharing Agreement’ available at 
http://www.google.co.za/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CB4QFjAA&url=http%3A%2
F%2Fwww.energy.eac.int%2Feapc2005%2Fpdfs%2Fconfrence%2520proceedings%2FCountry%2520Presenta
tions%2FTanzania%2FModel%2520Production%2520Sharing%2520Agreement%2520%2520Mr.%2520Yon
a%2520Killagane.pdf&ei=LN9oVOKHBKPGsQTAyYLgDw&usg=AFQjCNEu5ivHTpba-xR40UzzZ_-
GKgfWqg&bvm=bv.79142246,d.cWc  (accessed 16 November 2014). 
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PEP Act in 1980.Following the enactment of the PEP Act the country formally 
adopted the production sharing agreements. A model production sharing agreement 
(MPA) was formulated in 1989 as a basis for negotiations for potential investments 
in exploration and production of oil and gas in 1989.115 There have to date been in 
place seven MPSAs, the latest ones being the 2008 and 2013 MPSAs. For the offshore, 
there have been four licensing rounds up to now. The latest round was announced 
for inviting bids in October 2013. 
All in all, a country’s choice of one form of agreement over the other is shaped by 
various factors. For instance, it is argued that concession agreements are generally 
used by the countries which are non-producers and are newcomers in the oil 
industry; thus would want to encourage foreign investment in the development of 
their oil resources.116 So, government grants concessions to attract investors.  On the 
other hand, PSAs are generally used by countries which want to participate more 
actively in exploration and production, refinery, marketing and distribution. The 
same applies to service contracts because they are similar to PSAs except for the fact 
that fees in service contracts are paid in cash whereas in PSAs the fee is paid in oil. 
Tanzania’s choice of PSAs signifies the country’s move towards more active 
participation in exploration and production. The country’s active participation is 
geared to ultimately retain technical know-how and contribute more to local 
population benefits. This explains the ‘national theory’ approach adopted by the 
country, the role of the TPDC as the national oil company, and the recent local 
                                                          
115Kilaghane Y ‘Tanzania’s Model Production Sharing Agreement’ available at 
http://www.google.co.za/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CB4QFjAA&url=http%3A%2
F%2Fwww.energy.eac.int%2Feapc2005%2Fpdfs%2Fconfrence%2520proceedings%2FCountry%2520Presenta
tions%2FTanzania%2FModel%2520Production%2520Sharing%2520Agreement%2520%2520Mr.%2520Yon
a%2520Killagane.pdf&ei=LN9oVOKHBKPGsQTAyYLgDw&usg=AFQjCNEu5ivHTpba-xR40UzzZ_-
GKgfWqg&bvm=bv.79142246,d.cWc  (accessed 16 November 2014). 
116Junseong Yi ‘Merits and Demerits of the Different Types of Petroleum Contracts’ available at 
https://www.google.com.eg/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CB4QFjAA&url=htt
ps%3A%2F%2Fwww.knoc.co.kr%2Fservlet%2FDownload%3Fnum%3D6%26fno%3D6%26bid%3DD
ATA1%26callback%3D%2Fsub05%2Fsub05_5_1.jsp%26ses%3DUSERSESSION&ei=IO_pVJAq0-
Vqj46BuA0&usg=AFQjCNG7AcK-zV9JgMbOm-6OPrno5npQtQ&sig2=-5TSPQssg3bQW6klNFZrFw 
(accessed 22 February 2015). 
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content policy which contains even requirements for local employment and training. 
Plus, arguably, the experience drawn by the county from the mining sector has 
influenced preference for PSAs over other forms of arrangements. 
2.8 Conclusion. 
Chapter Two sought to identify legal theories underlying oil and gas as property 
under international law, namely, national ownership, private ownership and the 
rule of capture.  It’s also been established that Tanzania follows the national 
ownership theory. Whilst doing so, Tanzania employs PSAs as a vehicle through 
which it allocates exploration and production rights. The next step therefore, which 
is what the next chapter explores, is the legal framework underlying the allocation of 
exploration and production rights through PSAs.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR OIL AND GAS 
EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION 
3.1 Introduction 
The Petroleum (Exploration & Production) Act 27 of 1980 (PEP Act) is the main law 
regulating the upstream sector in Tanzania.  Despite being a specific energy sector, 
oil and gas exploration and production is also an economic activity. As with other 
economic activities there are a number of regulations and laws that directly or 
indirectly refer to the activity. These include, for instance, the Income Tax Act 11 of 
2004, the Fair Competition Act 8 of 2003, the Companies Act 12 of 2002, and the 
Tanzania Investment Act 26 of 1997. 
The PEP Act is the main legislation, however, that specifically deals with exploration 
and production. For that reason, the analysis in this part is basically centred on the 
provisions of the Act relevant to foreign direct investment (FDI) in the upstream 
sector. Briefly, where relevant, the provisions of other legislation are discussed, too.  
Chapter Three is divided into three parts. The first part is about the legal framework 
and highlights relevant substantive provisions. The second part analyses the 
institutions directly involved with the regulation of the upstream sector. For the 
purpose of this thesis the Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation (TPDC), 
the Commissioner for Petroleum Affairs and the Ministry responsible for petroleum 
affairs will be discussed. The last part identifies other relevant FDI considerations for 
the upstream sector. 
3.2 The legal framework 
3.2.1 The Petroleum (Exploration & Production) Act: Objectives and application 
The PEP Act was enacted as Act number 27 of 1980. It was assented to by Tanzania’s 
first president, President Julius Nyerere, on 8th September 1980, and later published 
under GN 88 of 1981. According to the long title of the Act, the PEP Act was enacted 
to make provision with respect to exploring for and producing petroleum and for 
related matters.  As stated in Chapter One, petroleum as defined in the Tanzanian 
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law, and as used in this context, includes both crude oil and gas.117 Even though the 
Act was enacted in 1980, exploration for oil and gas had already started long before 
since 1952. Activities were then regulated by the Mining (Mineral Oil) Ordinance 
Cap 399, which was repealed by the PEP Act in 1980.  
PEP Act applies to the Tanzania mainland and Zanzibar. Tanzania is a United 
Republic comprising two former States, namely, Tanganyika (now Tanzania 
mainland) and Zanzibar, whose union was born on April 26, 1964. While 
international sovereignty lies with the union government118, represented by the 
United Republic of Tanzania, Zanzibar (through the revolutionary government of 
Zanzibar) retains some sovereignty, and this includes legislative powers on non-
union matters119 vested in the representative council of Zanzibar.120 
The extension of applicability of the Act to Zanzibar may have been deliberate, since 
Zanzibar is an island and as oil and gas reserves can generally be found offshore or 
onshore.  The Act also applies to, and in respect of, the sea-bed, and subsoil of the 
continental shelf,121 which makes all the sea area under the country’s jurisdiction 
eligible for exploration. Despite that logic, and the retention of some legislative 
powers by Zanzibar, the extension of the Act might not be termed unconstitutional 
since oil and gas as natural resources are a mandate of the union government. The 
Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977122 under article (4) (3) provides 
for union and non-union matters. The Constitution also lists the union matters in the 
First Schedule thereto, in which clause 15 specifically lists ‘mineral oil resources, 
                                                          
117Section 5 of PEP Act RE 2002 
118For further reading on Zanzibar and Tanganyika Union Structure: Ghai Y ‘Zanzibar in Tanzania’ in 
Ghai Y & Woodman S (eds) Practising Self-Government. A comparative study of Autonomous Regions 
(2013). 
119Article 78 (1) of the Constitution of Zanzibar, 1984. 
120Haule R ‘Torturing the Union? An Examination of the Union of Tanzania and its constitutionality’ 
(2006) 66 ZaoRV215 233 available at http://www.zaoerv.de/66_2006/66_2006_1_b_215_234.pdf (accessed 
15 April 2015). 
121Section 2 of PEP Act RE 2002 
122Cap 2 RE 2002 
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including crude oil or products and natural gas.’123  It should be taken into account 
that currently while writing this thesis, Tanzania is promulgating a new Constitution 
and Tanzanians are expected to vote for or against the new Draft Constitution in 
2015 on a date to be determined by the National Electoral Commission (NEC).The 
proposed Draft Constitution124 which Tanzanians will vote for or against has 
reduced union matters, and specifically does not mention oil and gas in the list of 
union matters. In the event the Draft is adopted as the new constitution as it exists, it 
might have an impact on the current framework, especially legitimacy of the 
applicability of the PEP Act in Zanzibar. But that is another topic which is not the 
subject of this thesis.  
The PEP Act specifically excludes the application of the provisions of the Act to the 
search for, or mining of any minerals. The reasoning may be simply because mining, 
and minerals as defined under section 4 of the Mining Act 14 of 2010125, are governed 
by the provisions of the said Mining Act.126 
The next discussion analyses a few provisions of the PEP Act relevant to FDI. These 
are entry requirements and licensing in part 3.2.2; exploration licences in part 3.2.3; 
development licences in part 3.2.4; assignment of interests (3.2.5); transfer of capital 
and profits (3.2.6); guarantees against expropriation; production sharing agreements; 
and finally, confidentiality of the PSAs. It should be taken into account that this 
discussion does not follow the order in which provisions are listed in the Act. On the 
contrary, the analysis picks a few provisions that directly have an impact on FDI and 
leaves out general provisions, such as those providing for day to day administration. 
                                                          
123Clause 15 of the First Schedule to the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977 
124The draft of the proposed new Constitution of Tanzania can be retrieved at 
http://www.zanzibar.go.tz/admin/uploads/RASIMU_YA_KATGIBA_INAYOPENDEKEZWA_sw.pdf(access
ed 15 April 2015). 
125Cap 123 RE 2002. 
126The recent Mining Act was enacted in 2010 and repealed and replaced the Mining Act, 1998. 
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3.2.2 Entry requirements and licensing 
As stated in Chapter Two, Tanzania follows the national ownership theory 
approach. As such, all petroleum in Tanzania is vested in the United Republic. 127 It 
is therefore the Republic that has the exclusive right and it follows that the same can 
grant rights to investors. This explains why the PEP Act provides to the effect that 
the exclusivity of the State is without prejudice to any right to explore for or produce 
petroleum which is granted, conferred or acquired under the PEP Act.128  It makes it 
also an offence for a person to carry exploration and production of petroleum 
without a licence obtained under Act.129 
The Act provides for two types of licences, namely an exploration licence130 and a 
development licence.131 These two licenses are discussed in part 3.2.3 and 3.2.4. As 
regards to entry requirements, the general rule is that only a Tanzanian citizen can 
hold an interest in a petroleum licence.132 With regard to exploration, an exploration 
licence can only be granted to a company, companies registered under Tanzania’s 
Companies Act or incorporated by or under a law in force in Tanzania.133 
A development licence, on the other hand, is only granted to a body corporate that is 
a company or a corporation incorporated by or under a law in force in Tanzania.134 
The wording of this provision may seem to lock out foreign firms from holding 
petroleum rights in Tanzania. However, the interpretation in actual sense means that 
foreign firms can acquire petroleum rights, however, subject to their incorporation in 
the country. The interpretation section of the PEP Act defines corporation to include 
a body corporate incorporated outside Tanzania. Furthermore, the Companies Act of 
Tanzania allows for the incorporation of foreign companies seeking to establish a 
                                                          
127Section 4 (1) of PEP Act. 
128Section 4 (2) of PEP Act. 
129Section 4 (2) of PEP Act. 
130 Section 21 of PEP Act. 
131 Section 37 of PEP Act. 
132 Section 13(a) of PEP Act RE 2002 
133Section 13 (a), (b) (i), (ii) and (iii). 
134Section 13 (c) (i) and (ii). 
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place of business in Tanzania through provision of a certificate of compliance. Also, 
the essence of the provision was probably to make the government through the 
TPDC hold an interest in any rights. The practice is that the government of Tanzania, 
through the Minister for Energy and Minerals, grants a licence to the TPDC, upon an 
application made, in relation to such area specified in the licence. The TPDC, in turn, 
holds the licence and engages an exploration company to undertake exploration, 
development and production activities.135 Applications for licences are made to the 
Minister.136 
The Minister may enter into an agreement with respect to the grant of a licence, any 
conditions to be included in the licence so granted, and any other connected 
matter.137 Usually the agreement is entered into by the Minister on behalf of the 
government of the United Republic of Tanzania, the TPDC as licence holder and the 
exploration company intending to conduct upstream activities as contractor.138 It is 
clear that the provision above under section 14 is the one from which the 
government derives the mandate to enter into PSAs with investors.139The following 
part discusses exploration licences in depth as per Tanzania law. 
3.2.3 Exploration licences 
The Tanzanian law does not specifically define ‘exploration licence’ or ‘exploration’. 
Section 5 of PEP Act only says that an exploration license is a license granted under 
section 21, whereas exploration operations are defined to mean operations for, or in 
connection with the exploration for petroleum. However, exploration in this context 
simply means the searching for petroleum under the Act. The United Kingdom’s 
(UK) Petroleum Licensing (Exploration and Production) (Landward Areas) 
                                                          
135Kapinga W & Thorns A, ‘Tanzania’ in Christopher B, (ed) The Oil and Gas Law Review (2013) 243-258. 
136Section 15 of PEP Act. 
137Section 14 of PEP Act. 
138Kapinga W & Thorns A, ‘Tanzania’ in Christopher B, (ed) The Oil and Gas Law Review (2013) 243-258. 
139The PSA between The United Republic of Tanzania, the TPDC and Pan-African Energy indicates 
under Article 2.1 that the PSA constitutes an agreement under Section 14 of the Act. Whereas the 
‘Act,’ as defined under the PSA’s Article 1.1 means the Petroleum (Exploration & Production) Act, 
1980 of the United Republic of Tanzania. 
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Regulations 2014 contain similar designation of licences, and provide that 
‘petroleum exploration and development licence means a licence to search and bore 
for, and get, petroleum in a landward area.’140 
The Tanzanian law enables the Minister, by notice published in the Government 
Gazette, to invite applications for the grant of an exploration licence in respect of 
specific blocks and to establish a deadline by which applications are to be received. 
The opening of the licensing rounds is a highly publicised event and bid documents 
are made available to interested parties setting out instructions to be followed by 
applicants when completing and submitting their bids. Interested parties are to 
submit, inter alia, proposals for work and minimum expenditure141 in respect of the 
block or blocks specified in the application, give particulars of the financial resources 
available, technical and industrial qualifications and resources, and submit 
proposals for the training and employment of citizens of Tanzania.142 An exploration 
licence remains in force for four years, starting on and including the date on which it 
was granted, but the Minister can extend it. The Minister is further required by the 
Petroleum Act to direct the holder of an area declared to be a petroleum location to 
carry out investigations and studies to assess the feasibility of the construction, 
establishment and operation of an industry for the recovery of petroleum in that 
location. Among the matters to investigate and study is the physical impact of that 
industry on the environment.143 
3.2.4 Development licences 
A development licence may be granted by the Minister if he is satisfied that a 
commercial discovery of petroleum has been made.144 An application for a 
development licence is made by the TPDC on the contractor’s behalf and is required 
                                                          
140  Regulation 2 of the UK’s Petroleum Licensing (Exploration and Production) (Landward Areas) 
Regulations 2014 
141 Section 30 (1) (a) (b) of PEP Act. 
142 Section 36 (b) of PEP Act. 
143 Section 34 (1)-(3) of PEP Act. 
144 Section 35 (1), (2) (a), (b) of PEP Act. 
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to include a plan drawn up by the contractor, in consultation with the TPDC, which 
is designed to ensure maximum recovery of petroleum from the development area 
concerned in compliance with good oilfield practices. 
The application for a development licence is to be made within two years of the date 
that the relevant blocks are declared to be a ‘location.’145A location is an area within 
which a discovery has been made.146 A development licence is granted for 25 years 
147with the possibility of an extension for a further 20 years.148 During this time, 
exclusive rights to carry on exploration and development operations in the 
development area and to sell or dispose of the petroleum recovered are conferred on 
the licence holder.149 
3.2.5 Assignment of interests 
The Act allows for the assignment or transfer of oil and gas interests upon prior 
approval in writing from the government of Tanzania through the Minister for 
Energy and Minerals.150 Specifically, the Minister is required to approve a transfer of 
a licence or an instrument by which a legal or equitable interest in, or affecting a 
licence is created, assigned, effected  or dealt with, whether directly or indirectly. 
Since the licence is held by the TPDC, where a contractor wishes to assign or transfer 
any rights under the PSA it is required to obtain prior written consent from the 
Minister of Energy and Minerals. Such consent is not to be unreasonably withheld or 
delayed.151 
As stated above in 3.1, because of its nature as an economic activity, and the 
insufficiency of the PEP Act to exhaustively cover every aspect, the oil and gas sector 
has multiple legal frameworks applying to it. Other legal instruments relevant to the 
                                                          
145 Section 35 (1) of PEP Act. 
146 Section 33 (1), read together with sections 5 and 43  
147 Section 42 (a) of PEP Act. 
148 Section 42 (b) of PEP Act. 
149 Section 41 (a)-(d) of PEP Act. 
150 Section 54 of the PEP Act  
151 Section 54 of PEP Act. 
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upstream sector include the Tanzania Investment Act (TIA) 26 of 1997, the Value 
Added Tax Act (VAT) 24 of 1997 and the Income Tax Act 11 of 2004. 
The TIA seeks to create a favourable foreign investment climate by granting various 
incentives, including fiscal. On the other hand, the TIA sets out the minimum criteria 
that must be met by any prospective foreign investor for them to qualify for a range 
of incentives under the TIA. There must be a minimum investment of US $300,000, 
for which the foreign investor is entitled to 100% control of the Tanzanian entity. 
Unlike Tanzanian investors, foreign nationals must obtain a permit from the 
Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) in order to be able to invest. This may appear 
discriminatory on the face of it. However, section 2 limits applicability of the TIA Act 
to, among other entities, a business enterprise which is authorized to conduct 
exploration or production operations or to construct or operate a pipeline under the 
Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act, 1980, or is seeking authorization to 
conduct any such operations as provided under subsection 2(1) (b) of the Act. 
However, there may be even stronger requirements attached to foreign investment 
under other instruments given the nature of oil and gas activities which require 
strong capital.  
3.2.6 Transfer of capital, profits 
Section 21 of the TIA, which relates to the transfer of capital, profits, and dividends, 
also applies to the upstream oil and gas sector. Section 22 of the TIA which relates to 
the guarantees against expropriation, applies to any business enterprise which holds 
a mineral right granted under the Mining Act, 1979, or a licence granted under the 
Petroleum (Exploration and Production) Act, 1980, as though the holder has for the 
purpose of those provisions been granted a certificate of incentives and protection. 
Article 33 (b) (iv) of the Model Production Sharing Agreement (MPA) 2013 provides 
that the contractor shall have the right to freely declare and pay dividends to their 
shareholders and to remit the same to a place outside Tanzania, under the terms of 
the Law. The TIA provides that the business enterprise that holds a licence in 
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accordance with the PEP Act 1980, shall be guaranteed unconditional transferability 
through any authorised dealer bank in freely convertible currency of net profits or 
dividends attributable to the investment; the remittance of proceeds (net of all taxes 
and other obligations) in the event of the sale or liquidation of the business 
enterprise; or any interest attributable to the investment. 
3.2.7 Guarantees against expropriation 
One risk of paramount consideration in FDI is usually the risk of expropriation.152 
This would be more important for FDI in Tanzania given the nature of oil and gas 
rights which as stated in Chapter Two, are vested in the sovereign. Being so.it can 
arguably be stated that the law affords room for the sovereign to intervene and 
acquire what belongs to her, for the investor is only grated ‘secondary’ exploration 
rights, so to say. The government has on several occasions in the past acquired 
private land rights for what it termed the ‘public interest’153, which though allowed 
under the law subject to compensations, was questionable,154 so both in terms of 
purpose and compensation.155 Although no compulsory acquisition so far has taken 
place in the oil and gas sector, it is important to have these guarantees in place.156 
The PEP Act is silent, but the various MPSAs (refer to the discussion on MPSAs in 
parts 2.7.3 and 3.2.8) have contained these guarantees. While the 2008 MPSAs did 
not provide any stabilisation clause the 2004 model provides a fairly standard 
clause:157 
                                                          
152Sornarajah M The International Law on Foreign Investment 4 ed (2010) 99. 
153 Section 4 (1) (g) of Land Acquisition Act 6 of 1967 Cap 118 RE 2002. 
154The Attorney General v Sisi Enterprises Ltd (2006) 9. 
155 Tungaraza JM The Legal Standards for Compensation in Compulsory Land Acquisition: Case Study of Dar 
es Salaam City (unpublished LLB dissertation, Saint Augustine University of Tanzania, 2012) 24. 
156Mato H ‘The Role of Stability and Renegotiation in Transnational Petroleum Agreements’ (2012) 
1Journal of Politics and Law33. 
157Delloite ‘The Deloitte Guide to Oil and Gas in East Africa Where potential lies’ available at 
http://www2.deloitte.com/za/en/misc/search.html#qr=The%20Deloitte%20Guide%20to%20Oil%20and%20Ga
s%20in%20East%20Africa%20Where%20potential%20lies&i=633&p=1&fr=0(accessed 16 November 
2014). 
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‘If at any time or from time to time there should be a change in legislation or 
regulations which materially affects the commercial and fiscal benefits afforded 
by the Contractor under this Contract, the Parties will consult each other and 
shall agree to such amendments to this Contract as are necessary to restore as 
near as practicable such commercial benefits which existed under the Contract 
as of the Effective Date.’ 
The latest MPA 2013 does not contain a stabilisation clause.  
3.2.8 Production sharing agreements 
Section 14 of the PEP Act gives mandate for the Minister to enter into an agreement, 
not inconsistent with the PEP Act, on behalf of the Republic with respect to the grant 
of a licence.158 The Act does not specifically provide that a PSA is the type of 
agreement to be entered into. However, as stated in Chapter One, the enactment of 
the PEP Act in 1980 implied the government’s intention to do away with former 
types of agreements it had entered into, namely the concession and service 
agreements. This is evidenced by the establishment of the national oil company, the 
TPDC, and the requirement that all licences must be granted to a company 
incorporated locally. Also, the fact that ever since the enactment of the PEP Act, 
licences are only granted to the TPDC which then enters into PSAs with exploration 
companies. 
So far the approach taken is the enactment of MPSAs which serve as the basis for 
negotiations regarding the actual PSAs between the Ministry, the TPDC and the 
investors. As stated in Chapter Two, the first MPA was formulated as a basis for 
negotiations for potential investments in the exploration and production of oil and 
gas in 1989.159 There have to date been in place seven MPSAs, the latest ones being 
                                                          
158 ‘Minister’, according to section 5 of the PEP Act refers to the Minister responsible for petroleum 
affairs. Currently the Minister responsible for petroleum affairs is the Minister for Energy and 
Minerals.  
159Kilaghane Y ‘Tanzania’s Model Production Sharing Agreement’ available at 
http://www.google.co.za/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CB4QFjAA&url=http%3A%2
F%2Fwww.energy.eac.int%2Feapc2005%2Fpdfs%2Fconfrence%2520proceedings%2FCountry%2520Presenta
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the 2008 and 2013 MPSAs. For the offshore, there have been four licensing rounds up 
to now. The latest round was announced for inviting bids in October 2013. The 
MPSAs are quite resourceful as they indicate the state of the industry at a particular 
moment and terms an investor is likely to be subjected to. This is true given the fact 
that the PEP Act is non-exhaustive and leaves out key aspects such as fiscal ones. 
Moreover, PEP Act was enacted 35 years ago; hence might not necessarily reflect 
industry requirements at the present. Therefore, while for example the PEP Act 
provides for payment of a royalty, 160 the actual percentage of royalty isn’t provided 
for and would be found in the PSAs.161According to Tanzania’s latest MPA of 2013, 
the royalty rate is 12.5% for onshore/shelf areas and 7.5% for offshore total crude 
oil/natural gas production (prior to cost oil and/or cost gas recovery).162 
There is something in the MPA 2013 that is different from the general structure of 
PSAs discussed in part 2.5.3. The 2013 MPA obliges the TPDC which is a NOC to 
pay the royalty. This is a difference because elsewhere it is the foreign oil company 
that is supposed to pay the royalty.163 But the divergence could probably be because 
in some other countries a foreign oil company is actually granted exploration and 
development licence. In Tanzania, the TPDC is the one holding the licence. And the 
PEP Act provides that the registered holder of development licence shall, in 
accordance with his licence and the Act, pay a royalty in respect of petroleum 
obtained by him in the development area.164 Yet again, the confusion is understood 
because a royalty, though features a lot in modern day PSAs, was generally a feature 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
tions%2FTanzania%2FModel%2520Production%2520Sharing%2520Agreement%2520%2520Mr.%2520Yon
a%2520Killagane.pdf&ei=LN9oVOKHBKPGsQTAyYLgDw&usg=AFQjCNEu5ivHTpba-xR40UzzZ_-
GKgfWqg&bvm=bv.79142246,d.cWc  (accessed 16 November 2014) 
160 Section 81(1) of PEP Act. 
161 For detailed analysis of current fiscal regime of oil and gas see Mgaya R Petroleum Taxation: A 
Critical Analysis of Oil and Gas Fiscal Regime in Tanzania (unpublished LLM thesis, University of Robert 
Gordon, 2014). 
162 The effect of Article 16 (c) of MPA 2013 is that as from 2013 royalties are paid to the government by 
the TPDC on behalf of itself and the contractor. 
163Bindemann K ‘Production-Sharing Agreements: An Economic Analysis’ (1999) Oxford Institute for 
Energy Studies WPM 7. 
164Section 81 of the PEP Act. 
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of concessionary agreements. In concession agreements, the IOC would pay the 
royalty. The PEP Act doesn’t specifically provide whether Tanzania should follow 
the PSA or concessions route so it could be argued that maybe the intention wasn’t 
to completely do away with concessions. But given the trend since the enactment of 
the Act, it can be argued to the contrary that the country really wanted to abandon 
concessionary forms of agreements. Either way, it must have been a move to 
increase the country’s share of earnings from oil and gas, because as it stands, 
royalties are paid to the government and are calculated on gross production before 
the IOC deducts cost oil and before profit oil is split between the TPDC and the IOC. 
It makes the TPDC pay the royalty on behalf of the IOC and itself. 
3.2.9 Confidentiality of the PSAs 
The only problem at the moment would be the non-disclosure of the actual PSAs. 
The PEP Act prohibits disclosure of information obtained by any person in 
connection with the administration of the Act.165 This has been interpreted to mean 
the actual PSAs between the Minister, the TPDC and the IOC are confidential. Even 
Parliamentary Accounts Committee (PAC) was in 2014 denied access to the 26 PSAs 
it had demanded from the TPDC.166 The row led to a brief arrest of the TPDC Board 
Chairman, Michael Mwanda, and the Acting Director General, James Andilile by 
police on the PAC’s orders for the failure of the TPDC to submit PSAs.167  Speaking 
in defence of the confidentiality, the Minister for Energy and Minerals at the time, 
Prof. Sospeter Muhongo, stated: 
 ‘We have to adhere to government regulations. We cannot subject the 
contracts to public discussions, because there are regulations in lace 
                                                          
165 Section 10 (1) (a)-(g), (2), (3), (4) and (5) of the PEP Act. 
166Kasumuni L ‘Muhongo: Why Bunge won’t see gas contracts’ The Citizen 4 November 2014 available 
at http://thecitizen.co.tz/news/Muhongo--Why-Bunge-won-t-see-gas-contracts/-/2304482/2521930/-
/format/xhtml/-/ci0uimz/-/index.html (accessed 21 February 2015). 
167Machira P ‘No contract is above the law-Ndugai’ The Guardian on Sunday 9 November 2014 
available at http://www.ippmedia.com/frontend/index.php/?l=73975(accessed 21 February 2015). 
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governing them. Even contracts between individuals, like yourself and 
somebody else must be governed by certain rules.’168 
There has since come to light the PSA between PanAfrican Energy Tanzania Ltd 
(which had acquired rights over the Songo Songo area), the TPDC and the Minister 
for Energy and Minerals in 2014.169Interestingly, the leaked PSA also contained a 
confidentiality clause.170 Likewise, some MPSAs contain confidentiality 
requirements.171 
This is an anomaly that calls for the extractive industries transparency initiative 
(EITI) which some other countries have already adopted. The EITI is a global 
standard to promote open and accountable management of natural resources.  It 
seeks to strengthen government and company systems, inform public debate, and 
enhance trust.  In each implementing country it is supported by a coalition of 
government, companies and civil society working together.172 Its core aim is ‘to 
strengthen governance by improving transparency and accountability in the 
extractives sector’ and it ‘supports improved governance in resource-rich countries 
through the verification and full publication of company payments and government 
revenues from oil, gas and mining.’173 Further arguments and imperatives for 
making oil and gas contracts public are discussed in part 5.3.5. 
                                                          
168Kasumuni L ‘Muhongo: Why Bunge won’t see gas contracts’ The Citizen 4 November 2014 available 
at http://thecitizen.co.tz/news/Muhongo--Why-Bunge-won-t-see-gas-contracts/-/2304482/2521930/-
/format/xhtml/-/ci0uimz/-/index.html(accessed 21 February 2015). 
169Mtega ‘Is there a contractual obstacle preventing TPDC from providing gas contracts to 
parliament?’ available at http://mtega.com/2014/11/is-there-a-contractual-obstacle-preventing-tpdc-from-
providing-gas-contracts-to-parliament/ (accessed 21 February 2015). The leakage is attributed to the 
launching of OpenOil, a repository of publicly available oil and gas contracts. It was also argued that 
this has been available since 2006 as part of the public filings of PanAfrica’s Canadian parent 
company, Orca Exploration Group, with Canadian regulators. 
170 Article 14.3 (a) of the PSA between PanAfrican Energy, TPDC and the Minister for energy and 
Minerals. 
171 Articles 16 (e) and 18 (n) of MPSA 2006 and 2008 respectively. 
172EITI ‘What is the EITI?’ available at https://eiti.org/eiti (accessed 05 April 2015). 
173 For detailed analysis of EITI: Shaxson N ‘Nigeria’s Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. 
Just a Glorious Audit?’ (2009) Royal Institute of International Affairs 1 available at 
https://eiti.org/files/NEITI%20Chatham%20house_0.pdf(accessed 05 April 2015). 
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3.3 Institutional framework 
This part discusses the main institutions involved with regulating oil and gas 
upstream activities, and which are provided for under the Petroleum (Exploration 
and Production) Act 27 of 1980.  Part 3.3.1 discusses the Ministry of Energy and 
Minerals, whereas parts 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 analyse the role and mandate of the Tanzania 
Petroleum Development Corporation (TPDC) and the Commissioner for Petroleum 
Affairs, respectively. 
3.3.1 The Ministry of Energy and Minerals 
The Ministry of Energy and Minerals co-ordinates and puts in place appropriate 
policies, laws and regulations and provides for their oversight to ensure sustainable 
development. The energy department under the Ministry of Energy and Minerals is 
mandated to administer the legal and fiscal framework for petroleum exploration 
and production in Tanzania.174 The PEP Act gives the Minister for Energy enormous 
powers, including granting licences, and renewing, suspending or cancelling 
licences for oil and gas exploration or development.175 It is the Ministry that also 
formulates policies in the energy and mineral sector, such as, the National Gas Policy 
and the Local Content Policy. 
3.3.2 Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation (TPDC) 
The TPDC is a wholly government owned corporation established under the Public 
Corporations Act 17 of 1969 which was repealed and replaced by the Public 
Corporations Act (Cap. 257 R.E.2002 of the Laws of Tanzania), and through GN 140 
of 30 May 1969. The TPDC’s mission is; 
‘ to participate and engage in the exploration, development, 
production and distribution of oil and gas and related services; to 
facilitate a fair trading environment; safeguard the national supply of 
                                                          
174Economic and Social Research Foundation Petroleum Exploration Study, A Baseline Survey Report 
(2009) 60. 
175 Section 14 of PEP Act. 
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petroleum products; at the same time developing quality and safety 
standards to protect people, property and the environment.’176 
The corporation’s objectives as stipulated in the TPDC (Establishment) Order 1969, 
include: the exploration and production of petroleum; to engage in distribution and 
storage facilities; to acquire exploration and production rights; to contract, hold 
equity or participate in oil and gas concessions, franchises and licences; to manage 
any legal entities delegated to the corporation; and to develop an adequate 
industrial base for the oil and gas industry. 177 The TPDC’s range of functions 
include: promoting the development and production of the petroleum industry; 
carrying on the businesses of prospectors, producers, refiners, suppliers and 
distributors of petroleum; engaging in petroleum prospecting operations 
(exploration, drilling, testing, appraisal, extraction, producing, treatment, storing, 
transportation etc.);  acquiring, by agreement, and holding interests in any 
undertaking associated with exploration and prospecting; managing the affairs of 
any legal entity either transferred or acquired by the Corporation; promoting and 
monitoring the exploration for oil and gas; developing and producing oil and gas; 
conducting research and development of the oil and gas industry in the country; 
managing exploration and production data; and marketing and selling natural gas 
under a PSA arrangement.178 Other powers and obligations of the TPDC stem from 
the PSAs concluded. 
The above provisions give the TPDC a wide mandate. The TPDC is the national oil 
company, but at the same time somehow a regulator. It also, in practice, has the 
privilege of acquiring all the interests in oil and gas for which it then grants 
secondary rights to contractors, hence defeating the spirit of the PEP Act which does 
not expressly give it an exclusive mandate. It can be argued though that this 
authority is derived from the TPDC (Establishment) Order of 1969 which as stated 
                                                          
176 Extracted from TPDC’s website, http://www.tpdc-tz.com/tpdc/ (accessed 22 February 2015). 
177TPDC (Establishment) Order, 1969. 
178Extracted from TPDC’s website, http://www.tpdc-tz.com/tpdc/ (accessed 22 February 2015). 
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above entitles the TPDC to acquire interests in licences or participate in equity. The 
PEP Act only provides that the licence is to be granted to a locally incorporated 
entity. Also, because the PEP Act does apply to both oil and gas, the TPDC 
automatically becomes the regulator and national oil and gas company. For example, 
it has already ben argued that the TPDC has roles as both the regulator of upstream 
operations and as the State oil company and ultimate rights holder, which creates 
confusion and conflicts of interest.179 Even the Public Organisations’ Accounts 
Committee (POAC) in 2010 proposed the disbandment of the TPDC into two 
separate entities, an upstream regulator and a national oil and gas company for both 
the two parts of the union, namely, Zanzibar and the mainland.180 As it will be 
argued in Chapter Four, there is a need to revisit the TPDC’s role and mandate. 
3.3.3 The Commissioner for Petroleum Affairs 
The PEP Act establishes the office of the Commissioner for Petroleum Affairs.181 The 
Commissioner is appointed by the President of the United Republic of Tanzania and 
as powers to carry out the general administration of oil and gas exploration and 
development activities.182 He is the general administrator. For example, when 
discovery of oil is made, during exploration, the licence holder is by law required to 
notify the Commissioner of the discovery.183 The Commissioner can issue various 
directions.184 Applications for certificates to surrender a block are made to the 
Commissioner.185 Among many other functions bestowed on the Commissioner by 
the PEP Act, the Commissioner is also empowered to resolve some disputes.186But 
the nature of the disputes that  the Commissioner is entitled to resolve are limited to 
                                                          
179Kabwe Z ‘Restructuring Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation (TPDC)’ available at 
https://zittokabwe.wordpress.com/2011/04/08/restructuring-reforming-tanzania-petroleum-development-
corporationtpdc/(accessed 22 February 2015). 
180Public Organisations’ Accounts Committee The POAC report 2010. 
181 Section 8 (1) of PEP Act. 
182Economic and Social Research Foundation Petroleum Exploration Study, A Baseline Survey Report 
(2009) 60. 
183 Section 31 (1) and (2) of PEP Act. 
184 Section 47 (2) of PEP Act. 
185 Section 49 (1) of PEP Act. 
186 Section 76 (1) of PEP Act. 
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disputes between persons engaged in exploration or development operations, either 
among themselves or in relation to themselves and third parties (other than the 
Government) not so engaged,187 in connection with the boundaries of any 
exploration area or development area;188 any act committed or omitted, or alleged to 
have been committed or omitted, in the course of, or ancillary to, exploration or 
development operations;189 the assessment and payment of compensation pursuant 
to the PEP Act;190 or any other matter which may be prescribed.191 The 
Commissioner’s decision can be in the form of a decree192 which has the same force 
of law as a court decree,193 and any aggrieved party is entitled to appeal to the High 
Court of Tanzania.194 
3.4 Other foreign investment consideration for the upstream sector 
3.4.1 Fiscal regime requirements 
There are different taxes applicable to the upstream sector. As explained in Chapter 
Two, PSAs by their nature afford an IOC recovery of investments in exploration and 
production, called cost recovery, and profit oil which is split between the IOC and 
the government in the proportions agreed upon in the PSA.  In Tanzania the PEP Act 
does not specify the amount of the royalty to be paid. However, Article 16 (c) of the 
MPSA 2013, provides that the TPDC agrees to discharge its obligation to pay a 
royalty by delivering to the government a royalty in the amount of 12.5% for 
onshore/shelf areas and 7.5% for offshore of total crude oil/natural gas production 
(prior to cost oil and/or cost gas recovery).195After the royalty, the contractor is 
entitled to deduct cost recovery not exceeding 50%.  The remainder is the profit oil 
which is divided between the TPDC and the IOC as agreed by the parties in the 
                                                          
187Section 76 (1) of PEP Act. 
188Section 76 (1) (a) of PEP Act. 
189Section 76 (1) (b) of PEP Act. 
190Section 76 (1) (c) of PEP Act. 
191Section 76 (1) (d) of PEP Act. 
192 Section 76 (3) of PEP Act. 
193 Section 77 (1) of PEP Act. 
194Section 78 (1) of PEP Act. 
195 The effect of Article 16 (c) of MPSA 2013 is that from 2013 royalties re paid to the government by 
TPDC on behalf of itself and the contractor. 
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PSA.196 Other taxes applicable include, but are not limited to, income tax, corporate 
tax, and capital gains tax. The 2013 MPSA also provides for additional profit tax, 
which though a good thing, isn’t provided for either in the PEP Act or other tax 
statutes, hence putting into question its legitimacy.197 
3.4.2Environmental requirements 
The Environmental Management Act, 2004 (EMA) regulates all environmental 
matters in Tanzania including the oil and gas sector. The EMA is based on, among 
others, the precautionary principle, the polluter pays principle and the principle of 
eco-system integrity.  Additionally, regulations have been published pursuant to the 
EMA including the Environmental Impact Assessment and Audit Regulations, 2005. 
The EMA requires an environmental impact assessment to be carried out in relation 
to projects involving oil and gas exploration and development in view of the 
potential adverse environmental effects such activities may have and in order to 
mitigate adverse effects by taking appropriate measures.198 Further, environmental 
impact assessments are also mandatory for projects involving extraction of oil and 
natural gas, the construction of offshore and onshore oil and gas pipelines, as well as 
separation, processing, handling and storage of oil and gas facilities.199 
3.4.3 Local content and training requirements 
The local content aspect ties in with the thesis question as to whether the legal 
framework provides for means to benefit the local population without necessarily 
encroaching on investors’ interests. Tanzania released its Local Content Policy in 
2014, which defines local content to mean the ‘added value brought to the country in 
the activities of the oil and gas industry in the United Republic of Tanzania through 
                                                          
196 Detailed profit oil distribution can be found in the MPSAs including the latest MPSA 2013. 
197Mgaya R Petroleum Taxation: A Critical Analysis of Oil and Gas Fiscal Regime in Tanzania (unpublished 
MSc thesis, University of Robert Gordon, 2014) 63. 
198McKenna C ‘Conducting oil and gas activities in Tanzania’ available at http://www.cms-
cmck.com/Our-Africa-Practice/Documents/conducting-oil-and-gas-in-africa-tanzania.PDF (accessed 21 
February 2015). 
199 McKenna C ‘Conducting oil and gas activities in Tanzania’ available at http://www.cms-
cmck.com/Our-Africa-Practice/Documents/conducting-oil-and-gas-in-africa-tanzania.PDF (accessed 21 
February 2015). 
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the participation and development of local Tanzanians and local businesses through 
national labour, technology, goods, services, capital and research capability.’200 
The PEP Act provides that an application for an exploration licence should be 
accompanied by, among other things, proposals with respect to the training and 
employment of citizens of Tanzania.201 The Act does not provide the extent or 
minimum requirements thereof. Due to that absence, currently, local content 
requirements emerge from the MPSAs. These provisions generally require a 
contractor to maximise the use of Tanzanian resources by giving preference to 
Tanzanian goods, services and materials of acceptable quality and price when 
compared to non-Tanzanian goods, services and materials; and making maximum 
use of Tanzanian service companies where the services provided are of a comparable 
standard and competitive when compared to those provided elsewhere.202 
The MPSA 2013 provides that a contractor shall comply with the government’s local 
content policy in force and as modified from time to time.203 The MPSA goes on to 
list a number of local content requirements, including purchasing Tanzanian goods 
and services, and to make use of Tanzanian service companies and contractors, 
where services are required.204 The list lists many more items, which shall be 
discussed in Chapter Four of this thesis. Suffice it here to say that contractors are 
also required to commit to employing Tanzanian citizens having appropriate 
qualifications to the maximum extent possible and to commit to a specified 
minimum amount to be invested annually for the training of Tanzanian citizens. The 
2013 MPSA sets this minimum commitment at US$500,000 annually for each year of 
the exploration licence, including extensions thereto.205 In the request for 
                                                          
200Ministry for Energy and Minerals The Local Content Policy of Tanzania for the Oil and Gas Industry 
(2014) iii. 
201 Section 20 (1) (c) (v) of PEP Act. 
202Kapinga W & Thorns A, ‘Tanzania’ in Christopher B, (ed) The Oil and Gas Law Review (2013) chapter 
19, 243-258. 
203 Article 20 (a) of MPSA 2013. 
204 Article 20 (a)-(p) of MPSA 2013. 
205 Article 21 (b) of MPSA 2013. 
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applications for exploration of the seven offshore locks and Lake Tanganyika North 
Block released in October 2013, this figure was non-negotiable.206 
Tanzania is a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The WTO 
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) prohibits some local 
content requirements as being contrary to Article III: 4 of the GATT 1994 which 
states that: 
  ‘the products of the territory of any contracting party imported into 
the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment 
no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national 
origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting 
their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, 
distribution or use.’  
This raises issues, which are discussed in Chapter Four of this thesis, regarding 
validity of Tanzania’s local content requirement in relation to TRIMs.  
3.5 Conclusion 
Chapter Three has highlighted essential aspects of the Tanzanian legal framework 
applicable to the upstream sector investment. The foregoing discussion suggests that 
the PEP Act does not exhaustively cover pertinent issues relevant to the modern day 
investment in oil and gas exploration and production activities. The inadequacy of 
the Act to meet changing standards of the upstream sector has necessitated the 
emergence of different mechanisms to fill in the gap. These as shown partly, and as 
will be shown in the next chapter, include the MPSAs, other sectorial legislation and 
policies. There exist to date some lacunae, uncertainty and regulatory ambiguity. For 
example, the role of the TPDC as a national oil company and a regulator, the legal 
basis for the preference of PSAs over other contractual arrangements, confidentiality, 
and local content requirements compatibility with WTO rules. The next two chapters 
                                                          
206Kapinga W & Thorns A, ‘Tanzania’ in Christopher B, (ed) The Oil and Gas Law Review (2013) chapter 
19, 243-258. 
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highlight these shortcomings in line with international standards for FDI and 
propose remedial solutions, respectively. 
However, the legal and institutional framework presented above indicates its own 
peculiar features that respond to local circumstances on the ground. Now that these 
are highlighted, it is important to look at the global investment standards which 
provide a yardstick by which Tanzania can assess itself.    
 
 
 
 
55 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
THE INTERFACE BETWEEN OIL AND GAS LAW AND THE PROTECTION OF 
FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In Chapter Three, the legal and regulatory framework for oil and gas exploration 
and production in Tanzania was explored. The Petroleum (Exploration 
&Production) Act 27 of 1980 (PEP Act) being the main legislation was revisited. 
Among other things, the entry requirements for foreign direct investment (FDI), 
licensing and fiscal regime were explored. Likewise, Chapter Three identified the 
institutional framework that the Act establishes. The conclusion was that the PEP 
Act falls short of current realities as far as FDI is concerned.  
This chapter explores the interface between oil and gas upstream law and the 
protection of foreign investments. It attempts to provide an answer to the following 
questions; is the law framed in a manner that guarantees protection of FDI?, and are 
emerging issues regarding local population benefits (such as the local content 
requirements) in the oil and gas investments (see part 5.1) investor friendly and 
consistent with the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs). 
In so doing, it attempts to strike a balance between the powers of the state to 
regulate investments in its territory and affording foreign investments the required 
minimum protection. 
4.2 Foreign investment defined 
In Salini Costruttori S.P.A &Itals Trade S.P.A v Kingdom of Morocco (2001) ICSID 
ARB/00/4 it was held that there would be an investment if four elements are 
satisfied. These are, a contribution, certain duration, participation of risk involved, 
and lastly, there must be economic development in the host State.207Sornarajah 
defines foreign investment as ‘transfer of tangible and intangible assets from one 
                                                          
207Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Itals trade S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, (2001) ICSID ARB/00/4  
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country to another for the purpose of use in that country to generate wealth under 
the total or partial control of the owner of the assets.’208 
For its part, FDI is described as controlling ownership in a business enterprise in one 
country by an entity based in another country.209 It would appear that though a form 
of foreign investment, it is distinguished from other forms of foreign investment in 
that FDI involves a more active and direct control of the foreign investor in the 
enterprise set in the foreign country.  Countries have a threshold by which 
investments qualify as FDI based on control and, among other things, the percentage 
of equity involved or decision making and management.210 In Tanzania, despite the 
requirement for being locally established or incorporation of a subsidiary of the 
International Oil Company (IOC) in the country, the IOC can still be majority foreign 
owned. The Model Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) 2013 provides that when 
the TPDC is willing to participate in a joint operation, it may contribute and have a 
participation interest of up to 25 per cent minimum.211 Therefore, an IOC 
participation in either the exploration or development phase of oil and gas in 
Tanzania would de facto qualify as a FDI.212 
4.3 Powers of States to regulate foreign direct investment (FDI) 
State powers to regulate foreign investment are linked to State sovereignty,213 which 
is a long established customary rule of international law. In some instances, these 
                                                          
208Sornarajah M The International Law on Foreign Investment 3 ed (2010) 4. 
209UNCTAD ‘Definition of FDI’ available at http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/Definitions-of-
FDI.aspx(accessed 11 March 2015). 
210UNCTAD ‘Definition of FDI’ available at http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/Definitions-of-
FDI.aspx(accessed 11 March 2015). 
211Article 10 (b) (i) of the 2013 MPSA. Note also that according to the MPSA, joint operations in this 
case means the petroleum operations in respect of which the TPDC has elected to contribute 
expenses. 
212In practice, since MPSAs are only a basis for negotiations, therefore actual participation under PSAs 
might be even below the 25 per cent stipulated in the 2013 MPSA. In fact, the invitation for bids and 
application for PSAs for Ruhuhu, Kilosa-Kilombero, South Selous, Malagarasi, South Lake 
Tanganyika, Lake Eyasi-wembere, Lake Manyara and Lake Natron released by the TPDC through 
tender no. 02 of 2007/2008 indicated a minimum participation by TPDC of 20 per cent.  
213Tshiamo K The Imperatives of Beneficiation Law for Botswana’s Diamond Mining Industry and its 
Implication for Foreign Investment (unpublished LLM thesis, University of Pretoria, 2014) 29. 
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powers have been codified through international instruments, such as, treaties and 
bilateral agreements. As highlighted in Chapter One, Article 2 of the Charter of 
Economic Rights and Duties of States (CERDS) recognises as part of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources aspects, such as, possession, use and disposal of 
all the State’s wealth, natural resources and economic activities.214  According to the 
CERDS, State powers include to regulate and exercise authority over foreign 
investment within its national jurisdiction in accordance with its laws and 
regulations and in conformity with its national objectives and priorities.215 Moreover, 
States have powers to regulate and supervise the activities of transnational 
corporations within their national jurisdictions and to take measures to ensure that 
such activities comply with their laws, rules and regulations and conform to their 
economic and social policies216; and to nationalise, expropriate or transfer ownership 
of foreign property, in which case appropriate compensation should be paid by the 
State adopting such measures.217 
It is at this juncture that international standards of treatment of foreign investment 
become pertinent. Despite the existence of international standards of FDI treatment, 
foreign investments have experienced varying problems in host countries, including 
expropriation. It is submitted that the absence of these standards would open door 
to excessive host State discretion and arbitrary interference with FDI to investors’ 
disadvantage. It is because of this reality that this chapter traces the evolution of 
these international standards and the extent to which they are applied in Tanzania. 
                                                          
214 Article 2 (1) of CERDS. 
215Article 2 (2) (a) of CERDS.  
216Article 2 (2) (b) of CERDS. 
217Article 2 (2) (c) of CERDS. 
 
 
 
 
58 
 
4.4 Historical development of minimum standards 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Barcelona Traction, Light and Power 
Company, Ltd (Belgium v Spain)218 ruled regarding the minimum standard of 
protection of foreign investment that: 
‘When State admits into its territory foreign investments or foreign 
nationals, whether natural or juristic persons, it is bound to extend 
to them the protection of the law and assumes obligations 
concerning the treatment to be afforded to them’.219 
In the past, foreign investment would be governed by general principles of 
customary rules of international law and laws of the host State.220 These host State 
laws were found to be deficient because they didn’t take into account foreign 
investors’ interests.221 An example of this would be the rules on the right of a foreign 
investor to make a monetary transfer from the host State to his home country. 
Secondly, the rules were vague and subject to different interpretations.222 Thirdly, the 
rules did not receive recognition and were not accepted in some parts of the world 
especially developing countries. But most importantly, it was argued that these 
principles failed to give the foreign investor an effective enforcement mechanism 
whenever they had a claim against the host State. The enforcement mechanisms 
available were to file a claim in the local court or seek recourse for their claim by 
their home country government. 
The inherent shortcomings of States’ laws led to diverging preferences with regard 
to minimum standards foreign investments should be subjected to.  While 
                                                          
218Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co Case (Belgium v Spain), ICJ Reports 1970 paragraph 33. 
219Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co Case (Belgium v Spain), ICJ Reports 1970. 
220Vandevelde K ‘A brief history of international investment agreements’ (2005) 12 University of 
California Davis Journal of International Law and Policy 157. 
221Vandevelde K ‘A brief history of international investment agreements’ (2005) 12 University of 
California Davis Journal of International Law and Policy 157. See also Salacuse J W ‘Towards a Global 
Treaty on Foreign Investment: The Search for a Grand Bargain’ in Horn N (ed) Arbitrating Foreign 
Investment Disputes: Procedural and Substantive Legal Aspects (2004) 51. 
222 Dodge W ‘Investor-State Dispute Settlement Between Developed Countries: Reflections on the 
Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement’ (2006) 39 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1. 
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developing countries argued for host State laws to be applied, developed countries 
wanted foreign investment to be subjected to the international minimum standard of 
protection principle.223 
Some States, especially newly independent, and developing were caught in the web 
to determine whether to adopt international minimum standards which appeared to 
be both interfering with their sovereignty224 and affording foreign investors more 
protection than their own citizens.225 
This led to the emergence of two doctrines, namely, the Calvo doctrine of national 
treatment and the Hull doctrine.226 The Calvo doctrine advocated for equal treatment 
between foreign investment and local investment. The doctrine required aggrieved 
foreign investors to file their case with the host State courts and the matter to be 
adjudicated in accordance with the host State laws.227 Furthermore it required the 
exclusive subjection of foreigners and their property to the laws and juridical 
regimes of the State in which they resided or invested.228 The Calvo doctrine or 
national treatment principle received a lot of criticism from the developed world, 
including the United States of America (US), which argued that the Calvo doctrine 
                                                          
223Brownlie I Principles of Public International Law 7 ed (2008) 519. See also Newcombe A& Paradell L 
Law and Practice of Investment Treaties (2009) 5; see also Kronfol Z A Protection of Foreign Investment: A 
study in International Law (1972) 14. 
224Subedi S P International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (2008) 8. 
225Kauschal A ‘Revisiting History: How the Past Matters for the Present Backlash Against the Foreign 
Investment Regime’ (2009) 50 Harvard International Law Journal 491 500; see also Borchard E, ‘The 
Minimum International standard in the protection of aliens’ (1939) American Society of International 
Law Proceedings 33.  
226Newcombe A & Paradell L Law and Practice of Investment Treaties (2009) 13. 
227Dolzer R & Schreuer C Principles of International Investment Law (2008) 11; see generally Kronfol Z 
Protection of Foreign Investment: A study in International Law (1972) 14; see also Wenhua S ‘Is Calvo 
Dead’ (2007) 55 American Journal of Comparative Law 123. 
228 Detailed analysis of the Calvo doctrine is available in Wenhua S ‘Is Calvo Dead’ (2007) 55 American 
Journal of Comparative Law 127. See also Verwey W D & Schrijver N J ‘The Taking of Foreign Property 
under International Law: A New Legal Perspective?’ (1984) XV Netherlands Yearbook of International 
Law 23. 
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was contrary to international justice as it advocated for confiscation of foreign 
properties.229 
The Hull doctrine, on the other hand, advocated for the foreign investor to be treated 
in accordance with an international law minimum standard of protection.230The 
minimum standard of protection principle required prompt and just compensation 
in case of expropriation of foreign property by the host State. The Hull doctrine 
received support from developed countries including international tribunals and 
courts. By the end of the 1940s the Hull doctrine or minimum standard of protection 
became so strong that it is considered to have swept away the Calvo doctrine.    
International minimum standards have evolved since and have been contained in 
various international investment instruments. One of the instruments that contains 
these international standards is the World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of 
Foreign Direct Investment, 1992.231This thesis relies more on the World Bank 
Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, 1992. The reason is that it 
seems to contain key standards that have been recurring in multiple other 
instruments, as pointed out in parts 4.4.1 to 4.4.9 below. However, before discussing 
these standards, there is a need to revisit, albeit briefly, some instruments which 
contain the international minimum standards. To that end, the discussion below 
picks a few international instruments which contained international minimum 
standards provisions, since the League of Nations in 1929. 
4.4.1 Convention on the Treatment of Foreigners, 1929. 
Article 23 of the League of Nations Covenant empowered the league to make rules 
in order to ensure equitable treatment for the commerce of all Members of the 
                                                          
229Subedi S P International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (2008) 16. 
230Subedi S P International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (2008) 9. See also Dolzer R 
&Schreuer C Principles of International Investment Law (2008) 11. 
231World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, 1992 available at 
http://italaw.com/documents/WorldBank.pdf  (accessed 25 March 2015). 
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League.232 By virtue of this, it came up with the Draft Convention on the Treatment 
of Foreigners. The Draft Convention provided for equal protection of foreign 
investors and nationals. It guaranteed foreigners the rights to exercise civil, judicial 
and succession rights. The Draft Convention also empowered foreigners to establish 
themselves in the host State, engage in any business and pursue any occupation.233 
The Draft Convention did not come into operation for lacking signatures234 
4.4.2 The United Nations (UN) Havana Charter, 1948 
Although the Havana Charter never came into force, due to lack of support by the 
US and other allied States, the Charter remains one of many historical documents in 
the efforts towards creating a unified international investment law. It came about 
after the Second World War. The UN organised a conference on trade and 
employment in Havana, Cuba, from 21st November 1947 to 24th March 1948.   It is at 
this conference that the Charter was born, which provided for the establishment of 
the International Trade Organisation (ITO).235 It was expected that the Havana 
Charter would be enforced through the ITO.236 The ITO was intended to promote 
bilateral and multilateral agreements on trade.  
Articles 11 and 12 of the Havana Charter provided for foreign investment 
protection.237 Article 11 required member countries to respect and protect other 
Member States’ enterprises, skills and capital which existed in their territories.238 
Articles 12 (a) and (b) provided for the need of host States to receive capital flow 
from other Member States for the purposes of stimulating local economic growth. 
However the provision left the mandate to the host State to determine the type of 
                                                          
232 Article 23(e) of the League of Nations Covenant, 1924 available at 
http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/6CB59816195E58350525654F007624BF (accessed 05 April 2015). 
233Newcombe A &Paradell L Law and Practice of Investment Treaties (2009) 17. 
234Newcombe A & Paradell L Law and Practice of Investment Treaties (2009) 17. 
235 The Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, 1948. 
236Shenkin S T ‘Trade Related Investment Measures in Bilateral Investment Treaties and the GATT: 
Moving Towards a Multilateral Investment Treaty’ (1994) 55University of Pittsburgh Law Review 541 
555. 
237 United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, The Final Act and Related Documents UN Doc 
E/Conf. 2/78 available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/havana_e.pdf  (accessed 05 April 2015). 
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investment it would allow in its territory and warned foreign investors not to use 
their investment to interfere in the internal affairs of the host State.239 
4.4.3 The Abs – Shawcross Draft Convention on Investment Abroad, 1959 
A decade after the Havana Charter, efforts culminated in a convention on 
investment abroad known as the Abs–Shawcross Draft Convention.240  The Draft 
introduced provisions which provided for minimum protection of investment 
abroad.241 Article II of the Draft Convention, in particular, required each State Party 
‘at all times’ to ensure the observance of ‘any undertakings’ which it may have given 
in relation to investments made by nationals of any other party. The Article was 
meant to ensure that at all times the host State would be held liable for its measures 
which affected foreign property regardless of the motive for such a measure.242 
4.4.4 The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Draft 
Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, 1967 
The Draft Convention, under Article 2, imposed an obligation on all Member States 
to observe an undertaking given in relation to the property of nationals of any other 
State Party.  The Draft however failed to garner enough support within the OECD 
Member States and as a result it was not opened for signature to the rest of the 
world.  
4.4.5 The New International Economic Order (NIEO), 1974 
The declaration of permanent sovereignty over natural resources is said to have 
spiralled oil price increases in 1973. Taking a leaf from this, developing countries 
also decided to push for systemic changes in major means of production, with a 
specific goal being regulation of foreign investment.243 They introduced an agenda 
                                                          
239 Article 12(c) of the Havana Charter. 
240Draft Convention on Investments Abroad (Abs–Shawcross Convention), reprinted in UNCTAD, 
International Investment Instruments: A Compendium (2000) Volume V, p. 395. 
241 For instance, Article I which provides for the Fair and Equal Treatment (FET) standard and Article 
III which provides for the rule against expropriation. 
242Potts J B ‘Stabilizing the Role of Umbrella Clauses in BITs: Intent, Reliance and Internationalization’ 
(2011) Vanderbilt Journal of International Law 1011. 
243Kauschal A ‘Revisiting History: How the Past Matters for the Present Backlash Against the Foreign 
Investment Regime’ (2009) 50 Harvard International Law Journal 492. 
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demanding a New International Economic Order (NIEO). It was a concern for 
developing countries that despite the declaration of permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources, trans-national corporations (TNC) were still controlling the major 
means of production in their territories and sometimes interfering with the running 
of internal affairs of host States. The NIEO was adopted by the UN on 1May 1974.244 
Under Articles IV and V, which resembled the CERDS, it provided: 
 ‘in order to safeguard resources, each State is entitled to exercise 
effective control over them and their exploitation with means suitable to 
its own situation, including the right to nationalization or transfer of 
ownership to its nationals, this right being an expression of the full 
permanent sovereignty of the State. No State may be subjected to 
economic, political or any other type of coercion to prevent the free and 
full exercise of this inalienable right.’245 
4.4.6 The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (CERDS), 1974 
The contents and summary of the CERDS is as stated in part 4.3. Suffice it to say that 
CERDS adopt Calvo’s approach,246 in that it makes foreign investment subject to 
State regulation and national laws.   
4.4.7 The United Nations (UN) Draft Code of Conduct for Transnational 
Corporations 
Article 4 of the NIEO provided for the need to establish two codes of conduct, 
namely, the Code of Conduct on Technology Transfer and the Code of Conduct for 
Transnational Corporations. Therefore in 1974 the Economic and Social Council of 
the UN (ECOSOC) established the Commission on Transnational Corporations 
(CTC) which was responsible to draft the Code of Conduct for Transnational 
Corporations.247 The Code was forwarded to the UN ECOSOC on 31 May 1990 for 
                                                          
244UN Resolution 3202 . 
245Article 4 of NIEO UN Resolution 3202 (S – VI). 
246Sornarajah M The International Law on Foreign Investment 3 ed (2010) 131. 
247 ECOSOC Resolution 1908(LVII) of 02 August 1974. 
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approval. Again there were areas of disagreement between developing and 
developed countries. 
Paragraph 48 of the Draft Code provided for host State powers over TNCs. It 
affirmed a State’s right to regulate the entry and establishment of transnational 
corporations including determining the role that such corporations may play in the 
economic and social development of the host State. The Code demanded a host State 
to accord TNCs fair and equitable treatment and to treat a TNC in the same manner 
as domestic enterprises. In addition, the Code recognised the need for appropriate 
compensation to be paid in case of expropriation.248 
4.4.8 The OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), 1998 
In another attempt, the OECD in 1995 introduced the negotiations on a Multilateral 
Investment Agreement (MAI).249The negotiations were launched in May 1995 by the 
Ministerial Council and started four months later in September of the same year. The 
objectives of the MAI were to reach a broad investment framework with an effective 
dispute settlement system.250 
4.4.9 The World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investments, 
1992.251 
The Guidelines in principle demand the host State to facilitate the admission of 
foreign investment into its territory. The Guidelines demand the host State to 
conduct itself well in the treatment of foreign investment but does not impose any 
obligation on the part of the foreign investor. 
Guideline II empowers the host State to allow or reject the admission of foreign 
investment. The guideline urges host States to be as open as possible to the foreign 
                                                          
248 Paragraph 55 of the Draft Code. 
249 The OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment Draft available at 
http://www1.oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/ng/ng971r2e.pdf (accessed 05 April 2015). 
250 Preamble to the MAI; Also part III and IV of the Draft MAI, 1998 available at 
http://www1.oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/ng/ng971r2e.pdf (accessed 05 April 2015). 
251 World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, 1992 available at 
http://italaw.com/documents/WorldBank.pdf  (accessed 25 March 2015). 
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investors.252 It also entitles the host State to reject the admission of foreign 
investment on the ground of national security, public health, protection of the 
environment and public policy issues.253 
Guideline III provides for the general investment protection principles. It requires 
States to grant foreign investment fair and equitable treatment, and the ability to 
transfer funds from the territory; provide full protection and security; and to avoid 
discrimination against foreign investments.254 Guideline IV provides for incidences 
which may amount to expropriation. The provision is very extensive and includes 
incidences which in accordance with the normal international customary law 
principles would not amount to expropriation.255 
With regards to dispute settlement, the Guidelines encourage parties to settle their 
dispute by using the national courts of the host State or by way of independent 
arbitration. In the case of arbitration, parties are encouraged to use the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)256 where both are members or 
the additional facility when one party is not a member of the Convention.257 
The Guidelines are criticised for being unbalanced as they impose obligations on the 
host State but do not do the same to foreign investors. Although the primary aim of 
passing the Guidelines was to promote investments the Guidelines ended up with 
provisions which aim at protecting investment and not merely promoting it. 
                                                          
252 Guideline II (3) of the World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, 1992 
available at http://italaw.com/documents/WorldBank.pdf  (accessed 25 March 2015). 
253 Guideline II (4) of the World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, 1992 
available at http://italaw.com/documents/WorldBank.pdf  (accessed 25 March 2015). 
254 See Guideline III (2), (3) and (6) of the World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct 
Investment, 1992 available at http://italaw.com/documents/WorldBank.pdf  (accessed 25 March 2015). 
255Subedi S P International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (2008) 36. 
256 ICSID is established through the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between 
States and Nationals of Other States (1965) available at 
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf (accessed 20 March 2015). 
257 See Guideline V (1) – (3) of the World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct 
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Having traced the evolution and development of international standards of foreign 
investment treatment, the next section specifically expounds on the international 
minimum standards and their applicability to Tanzania’s oil and gas sector. 
4.5 The international minimum standards in relation to the oil and gas law in 
Tanzania 
According to Sornarajah, there are three instances in which case law on State 
responsibility provides guidance as to the international minimum standard. These 
relate to compensation for expropriation, responsibility for destruction or violence 
by non-State actors, and denial of justice.258 But where there is a treaty on investment 
which makes reference to an international minimum standard, the treaty 
conclusively establishes the existence of the standard as between the parties.  
To date, most investment treaties refer to standards of treatment such as Fair and 
Equitable Treatment (FET)259, Full Protection and Security (FPS), non-arbitrariness, 
and non-discrimination. 
Below is a discussion of some of the most important protection measures available to 
foreign investments, both existing and potential investments. For the purpose of this 
thesis, the discussion is based on five standards, namely, fair and equitable 
treatment, full protection and security, non-arbitrariness, non-discrimination and 
national treatment, and compensable expropriation.  The choice of these standards is 
merely because they recur in various instruments as discussed under the evolution 
of international standards in parts 4.4.1 to 4.4.9 above. 
4.5.1 Fair and equitable treatment (FET) 
The Havana Charter for International Trade Organisation (ITO) provided that FDI in 
host countries was to be accorded fair and equitable treatment.260  Breach of fair and 
                                                          
258Sornarajah M The International Law on Foreign Investment 3 ed (2010) 346. 
259 Guideline 3, World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, 1992 available 
at http://italaw.com/documents/WorldBank.pdf  (accessed 28 March 2015). 
260 Article 11 (2) of The Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization, 1948. 
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equitable treatment can be through lack of due diligence, due process261, denial of 
justice262, and violation of legitimate expectation.263 The courts’ interpretation of fair 
and equitable treatment is expanding, and as such, other aspects not originally 
considered part of FET are now deemed part and parcel thereof.264In Genin v Estonia, 
the arbitration tribunal stated that a violation of the fair and equitable principle 
could be established by acts showing willful neglect of duty, an insufficiency of 
action falling far below international standards, or even subjective bad faith.265 
The government of Tanzania is keen on attracting FDI given the financial and 
technical constraints on its part to solely engage in the exploration for and 
production of oil and gas. As such, despite the PEP Act being enacted 35 years ago, 
Tanzania has no reputation for frustrating oil and gas investors. By ‘frustrating,’ 
reference is made to the fact that there has not been a single incident or case where a 
foreign oil company has complained or lodged a complaint against Tanzania with 
regard to any violation of FET. Not one complaint, either, on violation of legitimate 
expectations, denial of justice or lack of due diligence has been lodged against 
Tanzania in the oil and gas sector. There are instances in other than the oil and gas 
sector where Tanzania was accused of having breached this standard. But the good 
thing is that investors have recourse to a legal remedy in such event. 
Even though the PEP Act does not specifically mention FET, Tanzania is a party to 
various bilateral266 and international investment treaties including dispute settlement 
                                                          
261Sornarajah M The International Law on Foreign Investment 3 ed (2010) 358. 
262Sornarajah M The International Law on Foreign Investment 3 ed (2010) 357. 
263Metalclad v. Mexico (2000) 5 ICSID Reports 209. 
264 In Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania which involved an investment in water supply, the Minister’s adverse 
comments as to the operation of the investor were held by the Tribunal to have caused a decline in the 
relationship between the investor and the government, hence a violation of the FET principle.  
265Genin v Estonia, ICSID Case No ARB/99/2, Award of 25 June 2001. 
266 For instance, the Agreement between the Government of UK and Northern Ireland and the 
Government of the United Republic of Tanzania for the Promotion and Protection of Investment of  
07 January 1994 available at http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/tanzania_UK.pdf (accessed 05 
April 2015). See also the Agreement between the Government of Republic of Korea and the 
Government of the United Republic of Tanzania for the Promotion and Protection of Investment 
available at http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/tanzania_Korea.pdf (accessed 05 April 2015). 
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treaties which guarantee observance of FET, and therefore investor can resort to 
them should they allege a breach of the FET standard.267For example, the Agreement 
between the Government of the UK and Northern Ireland and the Government of 
the United Republic of Tanzania for the Promotion and Protection of Investment of 
07 January 1994 (UK-Tanzania BIT) contains the principle of Fair and Equitable 
Treatment under Article 2. A reference to this provision was made at some point 
when the country was brought to the ICSID by a foreign investor. Although The UK-
Tanzania BIT does not expressly refer to international customary law or 
international law, it was found in the case of Biwater Gauff Ltd. v. United Republic of 
Tanzania268that the content of such standard is not materially different from 
customary international law. Further, the Tribunal held that this lack of definition in 
the treaty gave the Tribunal much latitude in its interpretation.  In addition, the 
Tribunal stated that it must judge the respondent’s (Tanzania’s) conduct in 
accordance with the principles of the standard applicable to the case, that is, 
legitimate expectations; good faith; and transparency, consistency and non-
discrimination.269 
Suffice it to say that Tanzania is a State Party to member to the Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States, 1965 
which establishes the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
                                                          
267 Some other bilateral investment treaties Tanzania has entered into include the Agreement between 
the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania and the Government of the Republic of Finland 
on the Promotion and Protection of Investments(2001); Treaty between the United Republic of 
Tanzania and the Federal Republic of Germany concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investments(1965); Agreement between the Government of the United Republic of 
Tanzania and the Government of the Italian Republic on the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments(2001); Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments between 
the United Republic of Tanzania and the Kingdom of the Netherlands(2002); and the Agreement 
between the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania and the Government of the Kingdom of 
Sweden on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments(1999). 
268ICSID ARB/05/22, Award available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/docu-ments/Biwateraward.pdf (accessed 
16 April 2015).  
269Para 529 of Biwater Gauff Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania ICSID ARB/05/22 available at 
http://ita.law.uvic.ca/docu-ments/Biwateraward.pdf(accessed 16 April 2015). 
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(ICSID).270 As will be discussed in part 4.6.1, Tanzania subjects itself to the ICSID’s 
jurisdiction, which gives investors recourse should there be allegations of violation 
of the FET standard in the oil and gas sector. 
4.5.2 Full protection and security (FPS) 
In the case of Biwater Gauff Ltd. v. United Republic of Tanzania271, the ICSID held that 
the FPS standard is afforded when a State guarantees a stable and secure physical, 
commercial, and legal environment.  For example, in that case, the Tribunal found 
that Tanzania's seizure of City Water's offices and the deportation of City Water staff 
violated Tanzania's obligation to provide a safe environment for foreign investors.272 
The fact that the standard is ‘full’ protection means it covers even a State’s failure to 
prevent actions by third parties, and extends to organs and representatives of the 
State itself.273 In another case, it was held that the standard imposes: 
‘an obligation of vigilance and care by the State under international law 
comprising a duty of due diligence for prevention of wrongful injuries 
inflicted by third parties to persons or property of aliens in its territory, 
or if not successful for the repression and punishment of such 
injuries’.274 
The summary of the above decisions is that the host government is responsible to 
protect foreign investment from commercial, physical and legal risks. Also, the 
government can be held liable for the violation of FET by third parties that are 
attributable to the State. The host State is required to provide FPS for foreign 
investments from risks, such as violence.  
                                                          
270Article 1 (1) of the ICSID Convention 
271ICSID ARB/05/22, Award available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/docu-ments/Biwateraward.pdf (accessed 
16 April 2015).  
272Schill SW International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law (2010) 198. 
273  Laird AI et al ‘International Investment Law and Arbitration: 2012 in Review’ in Bjorklund A (ed) 
Yearbook on International Investment Law & Policy 2012-2013(2014) 161. 
274Para 272 of Ulysseas Inc v The Republic of Ecuador (UNCITRAL), Final Award, 12 June  
2012. 
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Over the years, FPS has been extended in practice to providing a legal framework 
that offers legal protection against the above risks to investors. Substantive 
provisions protecting investments and appropriate procedures enabling investors to 
vindicate their rights are now envisaged. In the case of Noble Ventures v Romania it 
was held that Romania was required to provide Noble Ventures with ‘full protection 
and security’ which required Romania to enforce its laws and grant police protection 
to foreign investments in Romania.275 
The PEP Act does not contain a provision that specifically refers to FPS. However, 
FPS can be assessed through the general vast country’s legal framework, with 
protection of properties by law, and how institutions, such as, the Police or courts, 
guarantee the private property rights of investors.  There hasn’t been an incident 
where oil and gas investors have lodged a complaint for breach of this standard. It is 
however submitted that since Tanzania is a party to various bilateral and 
international agreements as stipulated in part 4.5.2, it shows her commitment to 
adhering to FPS. 
For Tanzania, concerns that local communities do not benefit from gas exploration 
and development contracts have at one point culminated in chaos which put gas 
exploration companies at the risk of violence. However, the chaos did not escalate 
because it was rapidly contained by the government.276 
4.5.3 Non-arbitrariness 
The case law definition of the non-arbitrariness standard can be found in the 
Elettronica Sicula S.p.a case, where it was held that a measure is arbitrary if it is done 
with ‘wilful disregard of due process of law, an act which shocks or at least surprises 
a sense of judicial proprietary.’277 Further, in another case, non-arbitrary was linked 
                                                          
275Subedi S P International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle (2008) 67. 
276 The Citizen Reporter ‘Tanzania battles deadly protests over billion-dollar gas project’ The Citizen 28 
January 2013 4. 
277Elettronica Sicula S.p.a United States of America v Italy (ICJ) 1989 
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to procedural irregularity and or bad faith.278 The relevance of these cases is that they 
provide a general interpretation of non-arbitrariness as an international minimum 
standard by which Tanzania’s PEP Act can be assessed. 
The PEP Act was enacted in 1980, prior to current discoveries and developments in 
the oil and gas industry in the world and in Tanzania. As such there are some 
aspects that might be relevant today in the industry but are not covered under the 
Act or the supplementing legal framework as they could not have been foreseen.  
One relevant example is the Additional Profit Tax. This is a tax based on the net cash 
flow from the development area.279 While the PEP Act only provides for payment of 
a royalty by a holder of a development licence, other legislation, such as the Income 
Tax Act, provides a whole spectrum of taxes to be paid. No legislation however 
provide for an Additional Profit Tax.  Nonetheless, the 2013 Model Production 
Sharing Agreement (MPSA) introduces payment of the Additional Profit Tax.280As 
stated in the discussion in part 3.2.8, the MPSAs indicate the country’s position and 
form a basis for terms of the actual Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) with 
investors, subject to negotiations and agreements.  One actual PSA in this respect is 
between PanAfrican Energy and the government of Tanzania relating to Songo 
Songo gas field in Dar es Salaam, and it also contains an Additional Profit Tax 
clause.281  The relevance of this PSA is that, if it is indeed the genuine copy, it 
conclusively depicts the actual terms of the PSAs entered to by the government and 
investors, because as a general rule these PSAs are confidential and the MPSAs do 
not necessarily reflect what the investor and the government will come to agree to at 
the end of contractual negotiations.   
                                                          
278Genin Eastern Credit Ltd v Republic of Estonia (ICJ) 2001. 
279Mgaya R Petroleum Taxation: A Critical Analysis of Oil and Gas Fiscal Regime in Tanzania (unpublished 
Msc thesis, University of Robert Gordon, 2014) 55. 
280 Article 17 (a) of the MPSA 2013. 
281Article 13.1 (a) of the PSA between government of Tanzania and the Pan African Energy relating to 
Songo Songo gas field in Dar es Salaam. 
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Because there is no legal basis for this tax, it makes it questionable whether the 
government is or would be able to enforce this tax282 and whether the inclusion of 
this specific tax isn’t in violation of the non-arbitrariness standard. 
4.5.4 Non-discrimination and national treatment283 
The basis of national treatment is non-discrimination between the foreign investor 
and a local investor conducting similar business.284 To determine the existence of 
discrimination, a comparison is usually made between two types of investor 
operating in the same sector and competing with each other.  If a national who 
operates in like circumstances is treated better, without justification, the principle of 
non-discrimination is said to be breached.  The objective of the national treatment 
principle is to address discrimination on the basis of the nationality of the owner of 
an investment. National treatment, as defined in a United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD) report, means that a host country extends to 
foreign investors treatment that is at least as favourable as the treatment that it 
accords to national investors in like circumstances.285 
The PEP Act does not contain a non-discrimination provision and neither does the 
2013 MPSA. However, the paramount question would be: are the IOCs treated any 
less favourably compared to local oil companies? First of all, until recently there was 
no local oil company.286 It makes it impossible to reach a conclusion that there has 
been any violation of the national treatment and non-discrimination standard as 
there were no local companies to compare their treatment to. The position might be 
different should one consider the Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation 
(TPDC), the national and government owned oil company, as a comparison entity. 
                                                          
282Mgaya R Petroleum Taxation: A Critical Analysis of Oil and Gas Fiscal Regime in Tanzania (unpublished 
Msc thesis, University of Robert Gordon, 2014) 55. 
283 Guideline III (6) of the World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, 
1992.Available at http://italaw.com/documents/WorldBank.pdf   (accessed 28 March 2015). 
284Sornarajah M The International Law on Foreign Investment 3 ed (2010) 337. 
285UNCTAD ‘Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment’ (1999) UNCTAD Series on Issues in International 
Investment Agreements 1. 
286 At the time of writing this thesis, there is one local company involved in the oil and gas sector. 
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While the PEP Act, as discussed in Chapter Three provides for the granting of 
licences to companies irrespective of whether government owned or not, the practice 
on the ground that a licence is granted only to the TPDC which then enters into a 
PSA with investors, including an IOC, raises an argument that the TPDC is treated 
more favourably than foreign oil companies in the country. 
However, the nature and roles of the TPDC makes it impossible to reach that 
conclusion. This is so because the TPDC’s role has been reduced to that of a mere 
regulator and not as an actual competitor but as a partner in the respective PSAs. 
This is so because the TPDC only holds interests, and does not directly engage in 
exploration and production. It enters into a PSA and can sometimes participate, in 
which case its participation, as discussed in part 4.2, is through these foreign 
companies and is capped, depending on the terms of the PSA. Thus, as discussed in 
part 5.3.3, it would be better to disband the TPDC into separate bodies to distinguish 
the roles of a regulator and national oil company from being exercised by one and 
the same entity. Furthermore, establishing two separate entities, one performing the 
role of national regulator and another being the national oil company will increase 
the efficiency. Finally, there will no risks of discriminatory treatment against the 
IOCs since the regulator will not be, at the same time, the competitor.  
4.5.5 Compensable expropriation 
Expropriation refers to measures taken by a State the effect of which is to deprive the 
investor of the use and benefit of his investments. The taking of property, depending 
on the form, is sometimes called nationalisation or creeping expropriation.287 
Creeping expropriation may refer to ‘slow and progressive measures adopted to 
initiate attrition of ownership and control rights.’288 
The PEP Act does not contain provisions on expropriation or nationalisation. It can 
therefore be said that currently in Tanzania the International Oil Companies (IOCs) 
                                                          
287Sornarajah M The International Law on Foreign Investment 3 ed (2010) 368. 
288Tecmed v. Mexico (2006) 10 ICSID Reports 54. 
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are guaranteed against expropriation because the law does not directly or indirectly 
allow the government to expropriate. Plus, because currently the licences are in 
practice issued to the TPDC which then enters into PSAs with the IOCs, there is no 
way the government can expropriate rights already belonging to the State. The risks 
would be in the invested properties not the licence, in which case the law applicable 
will squarely protect private property rights. The Constitution provides for the right 
to own private property and the protection of the same under the law.289 The 
Constitution also provides that it is unlawful for any person to be deprived of his 
property for the purposes of nationalisation or any other purposes without the 
authority of a law which makes provision for fair and adequate compensation.290 The 
only other way the government can indirectly expropriate would be through 
compulsory land acquisition through the Land Acquisition Act which allows the 
President to acquire land for a public purpose or public interest.291 However, the 
Land Acquisition Act read together with the constitution and the Land Act also 
demands adequate, prompt, full and fair compensation.292 But again, it is not 
possible for the government to invoke this law to expropriate because foreigners are 
not allowed to own land in Tanzania according to the law,293 except for investment in 
which case they can be granted derivative rights.294 Companies whose majority 
shareholders or owners are non-citizens are also deemed to be non-citizens or a 
foreign company.295 This means technically that investors cannot be expropriated of 
their land rights based on these provisions because the land itself does not belong to 
                                                          
289 Article 24 (1) of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania. 
290 Article 24 (2) of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania. 
291 Section 4 (1) (g) of Land Acquisition Act 6 of 1967 Cap 118 RE 2002. 
292 Section 3(1) (g) of the Land Act 1999. 
293 Section 20 (1) of the Land Act provides that ‘for avoidance of doubt, a non-citizen shall no 
t be allocated or granted land unless it is for investment purposes under the Tanzania Investment 
Act Cap. 38.’ 
294 Section 20 (2) of the Land Act provides that ‘Land to be designated for investment purposes under 
subsection (1) of this section shall be identified, gazetted and allocated to the Tanzania Investment 
Centre which shall create derivative rights to investors.’ 
295Section 20 (4) of the Land Act 1999. 
 
 
 
 
75 
 
the investor but the government. Investors would only be entitled to improvements 
over the land. But that is a topic not relevant to this thesis. 
A more pertinent question would be whether there are guarantees that laws might 
not change in the future, or that nothing will happen that might amount to indirect 
expropriation. Given the above, there is a need to have a specific State commitment 
under the PEP Act to guarantee that no expropriation shall be legally supported, or 
if need be, subject to compensation based on international standards. This also calls 
for another more viable option, which is to have stabilisation clauses, and to 
internationalise these clauses to make the State’s obligations international 
commitments.   
Historically, Tanzania exercised direct expropriation after formally adopting 
socialism,296 through the Arusha Declaration of 1967. At the time, the country also 
enacted the Nationalisation Act 2 of 1967 which empowered the State to expropriate 
various enterprises for public purposes.297  A number of enterprises were affected, 
including banks. But in all fairness, it should also be pointed out that this 
expropriation then was legal, as it followed due legal procedures, it was for public 
purposes and compensation was paid,298 which are the requirements for a lawful 
expropriation.  
The discussion above in parts 4.5.1 to 4.5.5 highlighted international minimum 
standards of FDI protection and compared adherence thereto under the Tanzania oil 
and gas law.  While the PEP Act has not categorically provided for these standards 
in exact wording, similar provisions were found to exist in PSAs and Tanzania’s 
international commitments through bilateral and international investment 
agreements it has entered into. On the other hand, in practice Tanzania is doing well, 
                                                          
296 Although in practice Tanzania is regarded since the 1990s reforms as not being a socialist State, the 
Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania of 1977 which is still in use to date maintains under 
Article 3(1) that Tanzania is a ‘democratic, secular, socialist State’. 
297Maina CP ‘Foreign Investments in Tanzania: The Mainland and Zanzibar’ (1994) 23. 
298Kimaro LM ‘Examination of the effectiveness of the regulation of Foreign Direct Investment in Tanzania’ 
(unpublished LLM thesis, University of Pretoria, 2014) 36. 
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since there has never been an incident or allegation of violation of these standards in 
the oil and gas sector. However, the country could do better in some aspects, 
especially through legal reforms to address either the lacunae or meet the new 
demands warranted by the evolvement of the sector, such as the Additional Profit 
Tax aspect, and the regulatory role of the TPDC. 
The foregoing discussion has shown how the law is silent on some aspects. On the 
other hand, even if the law wasn’t silent, it is submitted that a host State will respect 
its commitment only to the extent it’s willing to. The next (4.6) part therefore 
discusses transforming a country’s commitments under investment contracts into an 
international obligation, which affords FDI a better safeguard. 
4.6 Internationalisation of PSAs 
There are three ways suggested for the protection of investment agreements between 
foreign investors and a host State. These include the adoption of a stabilisation 
clause, and internationalisation of the agreements through clauses dealing with 
choice of law, and independent arbitration.  Stabilisation clauses under Tanzanian 
law have been discussed in part 3.2.7. This part therefore discusses below the two 
remaining aspects, namely, choice of law and independent arbitration, respectively. 
4.6.1 Independent arbitration 
As said above, with regards to dispute settlement, the World Bank Guidelines on the 
Treatment of Foreign Direct Investments, 1992299 encourages parties to settle their 
dispute by using the national courts of the host State or by way of independent 
arbitration.  In the case of arbitration parties are encouraged to use the ICSID where 
both are parties to, or the additional facility when one party is not a party to, the 
Convention.300 
                                                          
299 World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, 1992 available at 
http://italaw.com/documents/WorldBank.pdf  (accessed 28 March 2015). 
300 Guideline V (1) – (3) of the World Bank Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, 
1992 available at http://italaw.com/documents/WorldBank.pdf  (accessed 28 March 2015). 
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In addition to being simpler, cheaper and binding, arbitration means that neither the 
host State nor the foreign investor will subject the determination of their rights and 
obligations to the courts of the other party’s state of nationality.301  This is well 
summed up by the English Court of Appeal in the case of Dallah Real Estate and 
Tourism Holding Company v Ministry of Religious Affairs, Government of 
Pakistan302where it was held that: 
‘one of the attractions of international arbitration is that it gives the parties the 
power to insulate the proceedings from the local jurisdiction.’ 
The PEP Act does not make any reference to arbitration and is therefore silent on the 
matter. Therefore it falls for the Tanzanian government and the IOC to negotiate and 
agree in the respective PSA whether they prefer arbitration, and if so, the mode and 
forum.  
The 2013 MPSA provides that disputes shall be resolved in accordance with the 
International Chamber of Commerce Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration (ICC 
Rules).303 The decision of the arbitrators is final; it is binding on the parties and will 
be enforceable under the United Republic of Tanzania’s laws.304 The place of 
arbitration, however, is envisaged to be Dar es Salaam, in the United Republic of 
Tanzania,305 and the applicable law shall be the law of the United Republic of 
Tanzania.306 
However, Tanzania is also a Member State of the ICSID; hence parties can resolve in 
their PSA to arbitration under ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings. 
This is actually the approach adopted in the PSA between Tanzania and Pan African 
                                                          
301 Brower C &Lillich R International Arbitration in the 21st Century, Towards Judicialisation and 
Uniformity? (1994) i.  
302 [2011] 1 AC 763. The relevance of this case is the Court’s acknowledgement of the importance of 
international arbitration as opposed to local dispute settlement mechanisms. 
303 Article 28 (d) of the MPSA 2013. 
304 Article 28 (d) of the MPSA 2013. 
305 Article 28 (e) of the MPSA 2013. 
306 Article 28 (e) of the MPSA 2013. 
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Energy.307  The TPDC is an agency of the government, and pursuant to the 
Implementation Agreement, it was designated to the Centre by the government in 
accordance with Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention.  
In accordance with Article 25(3) of the ICSID Convention, and pursuant to the 
Implementation Agreement, the Tanzanian government, the PSA reads, had given 
its approval to the TPDC’s consent to submit the PSA to arbitration under the ICSID 
Convention.308  This PSA also provides that if jurisdictional requirements of the 
ICSID are not met, then the dispute can be resolved in accordance with the ICC 
Rules. While this PSA provides that the place of arbitration shall be Dar es Salaam, 
Tanzania, it still allows the affected party to opt arbitration outside of Tanzania, in 
which event the arbitration shall be conducted in London, England, and the party 
requiring arbitration outside Tanzania shall pay the travel and related costs of all 
parties.309 This is commendable because it offers flexibility to the investor, although it 
can also be argued that it indirectly coerces the foreign investor to resort to Tanzania 
as the place of arbitration to avoid costs he will have to incur for both parties. To 
secure independence of the arbitrator, the PSA also provides that no arbitrator shall 
be a national of the jurisdiction of any party to the PSA. Further, he shall not be a 
national of the jurisdiction of any shareholder or group of shareholders holding 
more than 10 per cent of the aggregate equity interest in Songas;310 or the jurisdiction 
of the ultimate parent company of any such shareholder of Songas; nor shall any 
                                                          
307 Article 27 (4) (a) of the PSA between government of Tanzania and the Pan African Energy relating 
to Songo Songo gas field in Dar es Salaam 2001. 
308 Article 27 (4) (a) of the PSA between government of Tanzania and the Pan African Energy relating 
to Songo Songo gas field in Dar es Salaam. 
309 Article 27 (4) (c) of the PSA between government of Tanzania and the Pan African Energy relating 
to Songo Songo gas field in Dar es Salaam. 
310Songas is a company jointly owned by shareholders including the Tanzania Petroleum 
Development Corporation (TPDC). Songas was assigned exclusive rights the by TPDC to explore, 
develop and sell the natural gas of the Songo Songo gas field. Under this PSA project which converts 
gas to electricity for usage, PanAfrican Energy is the operator. Therefore the relevance of this 
provision is to remove the possibility of bias that may arise from an arbitrator who has an interest by 
virtue of being a national of the same country as the entity.  
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such arbitrator be an employee, agent or contractor or former employee, agent or 
contractor of any party.311 
4.6.2 Choice of law clause 
In the case of British Petroleum Co Ltd v Libyan Arab Republic312 the concept of choice of 
law was linked to the principle of autonomy. The principle of autonomy means that 
parties have the freedom to determine how they want the disputes to be resolved, 
and is contained in different wording in different instruments.313 
It is observed that subjecting the contracts to the host State’s law comes with risks, 
such as, instability and the fact that the State’s contractual commitments are as 
reliable as its continuing willingness to abide thereby.314 As such, the way to 
safeguard a foreign investor would be to subject the contract to international law or 
general principles of law. But most effective, is to attribute the contracts to 
international law and not the laws of the host States, thereby constituting 
international commitments for the host State.315 It gives parties the means to adopt a 
neutral legal system which may lead to stability in the investment agreement. It has 
actually proven helpful to investors in many instances, including in the cases of 
Libyan American Oil Company v Libyan Arab Republic316 and Texas Overseas Petroleum 
Co & California Asiatic Oil Co Ltd v Libyan Arab Republic.317 In these two cases, 
although Libya relied on national law in nationalising the IOCs’ investments, there 
were clauses in the contracts to the effect that Libyan law would be valid to the 
extent that it was compliant with international law and the commitments of the 
Libyan government thereto.  
                                                          
311 Article 27 (4) (d) of the PSA between government of Tanzania and the Pan African Energy relating 
to Songo Songo gas field in Dar es Salaam. 
312 (1979) 53 ILR 297. 
313 Article 19 (1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law provides that ‘subject to the provision of this Law, the 
Parties are free to agree on the procedure to be followed by arbitral tribunal in conducting the 
proceedings.’  Likewise, the United Kingdom’s Arbitration Act, 1996 section 1 (b) provides that 
parties have the freedom to decide how they want their disputes resolved. 
314Herdegen M Principles of International Economic Law (2013) 377. 
315Herdegen M Principles of International Economic Law (2013) 377. 
316(1981) 20 ILM 1. 
317 (1978) 17 ILM 1. 
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In Tanzania the PEP Act provides that Commissioner for Petroleum Affairs will have 
powers to determine disputes between the parties either among themselves or in 
relation to themselves and third parties318, and appeals therefrom will lie to the High 
Court of Tanzania.319 It does not indicate the law applicable, which means that the 
law applicable should be the one the parties have agreed upon in their respective 
PSAs and that in the absence of that, local law may be applicable.320 But noticeable is 
the fact that the Commissioner’s power to hear dispute excludes those disputes in 
which the government is a party, which means an IOC has a choice of law and 
forum applicable in a dispute with the government subject to the PSA entered.  
But if the 2013 MPSA should be anything to rely on, then Tanzania prefers 
Tanzanian law to be applicable.  The 2013 MPSA’s Article 29 states:  ‘This Agreement 
shall be governed by, interpreted and construed in accordance with the Laws of the 
United Republic of Tanzania.’  It could be argued that the 2013 MPSA is just a model 
forming the basis for negotiation and therefore might not reflect the reality in the 
actual PSAs entered into. Nevertheless, the leaked PSA between the Tanzanian 
government and PanAfrican Energy also provided for the Tanzanian law to be the 
applicable law.321 
The above discussion highlights the protection of host State’s commitments to FDI, 
and guarantees of this protection through subjecting the commitments to 
international law and legal recourse. This is done through choice of law clauses, 
independent arbitration and stabilisation clauses. Based on the MPSAs and 
Tanzania’s PSA with PanAfrican Energy which has come into public domain as 
                                                          
318 Section 76 (1) of the PEP Act. 
319 Section 78 (1) of the PEP Act. 
320 In one incident a Tanzanian businessman sued three IOCs in the High Court of Tanzania for 
allegedly having been coerced by the three respondent firms to surrender his interests in three gas 
blocks and to receive undervalued consideration of 7.5 million US dollars. See Kapama F ‘Court 
summons three foreign oil companies’ Daily News 29 June 2014 3. Available at 
http://archive.dailynews.co.tz/index.php/local-news/33101-court-summons-three-foreign-oil-companies 
(accessed 27th March 2015). 
321Article 28.5 of the PSA with PanAfrican Energy. 
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discussed in part 3.2.9, Tanzania has shown willingness to subject itself to 
international arbitration. As for choice of law, Tanzania still indicates her intention 
for the local law to be applicable to govern the interpretation of her FDI contracts.  
4.7 Local content as an emerging issue in oil and gas investment in Tanzania 
This part discusses the local content requirements in Tanzania’s oil and gas sector in 
its relation to the country’s commitments under international law, particularly the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO).  It answers the third research question of this 
thesis, which is about striking a balance between local population benefits in the oil 
and gas sector and FDI. 
One of the issues at the moment is the local population benefits in the oil and gas 
sector in Tanzania.322 One way by which the authorities have sought to address this 
issue is through adoption of local content requirements.323Local content has a wide 
meaning, but in the oil and gas sector, it refers to an intervention by a national 
government aimed at ensuring that the majority of the goods and services required 
at each stage of the oil and gas value chain are locally supplied.324 It covers aspects, 
such as, employment of locals, and sourcing of locally produced goods and services. 
A number of countries already have local content rules and legislation, including, for 
instance, Nigeria. Part 4.7.1 below discusses the proposals for local content 
requirements currently being advocated for in Tanzania. It should be noted that 
unlike Nigeria and a few other countries, Tanzania does not have a local content Act 
in place yet. It is believed that the Local Content Policy, whose first draft was 
released in 2014, might lead to the enactment of a local content Act in the near 
future. Should it be so, it is proper to assess whether this Act will be compatible with 
the country’s obligations under the WTO.  
                                                          
322Howell N ‘Tanzania Publishes First Draft of a Long-Awaited Local Content Policy’ available at 
http://www.kslaw.com/library/newsletters/EnergyNewsletter/2014/July/article2.html (accessed 17 April 
2015). 
323Ministry of Energy and Minerals The Local Content Policy of Tanzania for Oil and Gas Industry (2014) 
324Easo J & Wallace A ‘Understanding Local Content Policies in Africa’s Petroleum Sector’ available at 
http://www.andrewskurth.com/pressroom-publications-1154.html (accessed 17 April 2015). 
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4.7.1 Tanzania’s local content requirements in relation to the Agreement on Trade 
and Investment Related Measures (TRIMs) and other standards. 
The Local Content Policy draft that was released in 2014 defines local content as; 
‘the added value brought to the country in the activities of the oil 
and gas industry in the United Republic of Tanzania through the 
participation and development of local Tanzanians and local 
businesses through national labour, technology, goods, services, 
capital and research capability.’325 
Local content as a policy  in  the oil and gas  industry is  said  to have originated  
from  the North  Sea  early  in  the  1970s  and  took  the  form  of  import  restrictions  
and or  the  creation  of national oil companies.  The major objectives for adopting 
Local Content Policies were the transfer of technology, provision of local job 
opportunities, creation of backward and forward linkages, and increase in 
ownership and control.326 
Tanzania does not have a local content Act yet but it is putting in place the Local 
Content Policy which might necessitate future amendments to incorporate the same. 
The first draft of the Policy was released in April 2014. The Policy itself only 
identifies issues and sets out Policy statements. It does not contain the actual 
requirements. The Policy does not have force of law because there is no legislation. 
However, currently, the local content requirements can be found in the MPSAs, 
including the latest one of 2013. Although MPSAs are just models put forward by the 
government which form the basis of PSA negotiations with investors, they indicate 
the country’s position at the moment. Likewise, this part makes reference to the local 
content requirements found in the PSA between Tanzania and PanAfrica Energy, as 
these give an indication of the government’s position at the moment. 
                                                          
325 Ministry of Energy and Minerals The Local Content Policy of Tanzania for Oil and Gas Industry (2014) 
iii. 
326 Ado R ‘Local Content Policy and the WTO Rules of Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs): 
The Pros and Cons’ (2013) International Journal of Business and Management Studies 138. 
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 The latest MPSA that was released in 2013, as discussed under 3.3.3, contain a 
number of local content rules including the requirement that a contractor should 
maximise the use of Tanzanian goods, services and materials of acceptable quality 
and price; and the employment of Tanzanians with appropriate qualifications to the 
maximum extent possible; and to commit an amount annually for the training of 
Tanzanian citizens.327 
4.7.2 Tanzania’s Local Content Policy vis-à-vis the Agreement on Trade and 
Investment Related Measures (TRIMs) 
This part analyses the compatibility of Tanzania’s local content requirements with 
the TRIMs. In so doing, it analyses the relevant provisions and case law, and 
compares the same with Tanzania’s local content rules. 
Article 2.1 of the TRIMs requires Members not to apply any trade related measure 
that is inconsistent with the provisions of Article III (national treatment of imported 
products) or Article XI (prohibition of quantitative restrictions on imports or 
exports) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1994. 
National treatment requires that foreign goods should be treated not less favourably 
than local goods.328On the other hand, import restrictions, foreign exchange 
balancing, and domestic sales violate Article XI of the GATT, 1994 on quantitative 
restrictions, and therefore are prohibited as well. Therefore it is important to analyse 
to what extent local content provisions violate these WTO rules. 
The TRIMs contains an illustrative annex of measures that are not compatible with 
the GATT Articles III and XI.  Measures violating Article III include local content 
measures which require the purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic 
origin or domestic source (local content requirements) while paragraph 1(b) covers 
trade-balancing the TRIMs, which limit the purchase or use of imported products by 
                                                          
327 Articles 20, 21 of the MPSA 2013. 
328Article III: 4 of GATT, 1994. 
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an enterprise to an amount related to the volume or value of local products that it 
exports.329 
In 2013, the WTO’s appellate body had an opportunity to make the finding 
regarding compatibility of the local content requirements with the TRIMs and the 
GATT in a case involving local content requirements set by Canada.  In that case, it 
was established that in May 2009, the Ontario Provincial Government in Canada 
established a Feed-in Tariff (FIT) program for electricity generated from renewable 
energy sources, such as, solar and wind power. In the FIT program, the Ontario 
government required electricity generators participating in the program to utilise 
power generation equipment to which was added at least a certain percentage of 
value (including material procurements and assembly) in terms of the Province’s 
local content requirements. Therefore, solar panels or other equipment exported by 
Japanese companies to Ontario received less favourable treatment than those locally 
produced.330 
The appellate body in the case above found that that the local content requirements 
accorded preferential treatment to products made in Ontario by requiring the 
purchase or use of products from domestic sources, which is prohibited in the 
illustrative list of the TRIMs Agreement. The appellate body found further that 
Canada was in breach of its national treatment obligation under the GATT Article III 
and the TRIMs Agreement Article II. The next paragraphs resort to answer the 
question whether Tanzania’s local content requirements violate the TRIMs and the 
GATT. 
                                                          
329Para 1 (a) and Para 2(a) of Annex to TRIMs. 
330WT/DS426 - Canada — Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program. See also; 
WTO ‘Release of WTO Appellate Body Report on certain Local Content Requirements under the 
Feed-in Tariff Program in Ontario, Canada’ available at 
http://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/2013/0507_01.html (accessed 17 April 2015). 
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First of all, the local content requirements that were found to be incompatible with 
the TRIMs and the GATT in the Canadian case above are distinguishable from 
Tanzania’s local content requirements.  
While in the Canadian case it touched on some form of tariff, in Tanzania’s case 
there is no tariff involved. Secondly, in addition to the absence of a tariff, there is 
also not any other incentive given by the government for the purchase of local 
goods, in which case it is difficult to argue that local goods are treated any better. 
Finally, even the way that the MPSA is structured, although it imposes an obligation 
for an investor to purchase local goods, does not make it illegal for an investor to 
import the same, at least according to the wording of the provisions and the absence 
of tariffs. Below is a provision extracted from the Model Production Sharing 
Agreement of 2013: 
‘The contractor shall …purchase Tanzanian goods, services and materials 
provided such goods and materials are of certified standard and quality in 
accordance with Tanzania authorities namely Tanzania Bureau of Standards, 
Tanzania goods and Drugs Authority or any other relevant authority 
established and operating under the Law’331 
 
Likewise, these local content requirements do not impose a quantitative limitation 
on goods and neither do they put a quota on goods to be imported, which makes 
them Article XI compliant.  It would be proper to argue that as they exist currently, 
the local content requirements in Tanzania are more of a ‘gentleman’s agreement’ 
than a legal obligation a breach of which might give rise to a cause of action. For 
instance, below is an excerpt from the PSA between Tanzania and PanAfrican 
Energy: 
‘PanAfrican Tanzania shall give preference to the purchase of Tanzanian goods 
and materials; provided, however, that such goods and materials are of an 
                                                          
331Article 20 (2) of the 2013 MPSA. 
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acceptable quality and are available on a timely basis in the quantity required, 
on competitive terms.’332 
It would be of assistance to compare the local content provisions in Tanzania with 
Nigeria, the latter being the biggest oil producer in Africa. As said in part 4.7, a 
number of countries have local content legislation covering oil and gas sector, 
including Nigeria.  The Nigerian Oil and Gas Content Development Act of 2010 
provides, for example, that: 
‘Subject to section 7 of this Act, the Nigerian Content Plan submitted to the 
Board by an operator shall contain a detailed plan, satisfactory to the Board, 
setting out how the operators and their contractors will give first consideration 
to Nigerian good and services, including specific examples showing how first 
consideration is considered and assessed by the operator in its evaluation of 
bids for goods and services required for the project.’333 
The provision in the Tanzanian framework that is closest to the Nigerian provision 
above would be Article 20 (k) (i) and (ii) of the 2013 MPSA, which provides: 
‘The contractor shall also provide to TPDC together with the annual work 
programme and budgets required under Articles 5 and 7a list of all projects to 
be undertaken as well as all goods and services that are required for the 
conduct of Petroleum Operations’ 
 
The difference between the Tanzanian provision and the Nigerian Provision is that 
while the Nigerian provision has statutory force because it is an Act of Parliament, 
the Tanzanian provision is found in the Model Contract and does not derive legal 
force from the law as there is no legislation in place. Secondly, while the Nigerian Act 
uses words such as ‘first consideration, exclusive consideration and Nigerian 
operators,’ the Tanzanian framework only uses contractor. Also, while there are 
                                                          
332 Article 15 (2) of the PSA between the government of Tanzania and Pan African Energy relating to 
the Songo Songo gas field in Dar es Salaam 2001. 
333 Section 12 of the Nigerian Oil and Gas Content Development Act 2010 
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instances where the Model PSA uses Tanzanian goods and services, the same can be 
argue to be saved by another provision which imposes a ‘non-discrimination’ 
requirement. Article 20 (e) of the MPSA 2013 provides: 
 
‘A contractor shall …Upon  purchase  of  goods,  services  or  materials,  
follow  an  efficient,  open,  transparent,  non-discriminatory and 
competitive purchasing and award procedure in accordance with the 
Law and Best  International  Petroleum  Industry  Practices and  submit 
the  relevant  procurement plan to TPDC for review’ 
 
While the Nigerian Local Content Act contains provisions that are considered to be 
contrary to the TRIMs provisions,334 there has not been brought to the Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism of the WTO any complaint against Nigeria by any State. 
Given the analysis above that Tanzania’s local content requirements are less 
stringent than Nigeria’s, it follows therefore that no legal implication might arise for 
the country for the same. However, the country just needs to enact legislation to give 
effect to the provisions in the Model PSA, and from which PSAs can derive their 
legitimacy or legal basis. 
The argument above regarding Tanzania’s local content requirements in goods can 
also be made in relation to the provisions for the local content relating to service 
suppliers. But these service aspects of the local content requirements do call for an 
analysis of whether these local content requirements in service supply are 
compatible with the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), from which 
this thesis desists given that service is a wholly different sector. Suffice it to argue 
here that Tanzania has made commitments only in respect of tourism and travel 
                                                          
334Odujinrin & Adefulu ‘Does the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act Conflict 
with the Country’s International Treaty Obligations? Available at 
http://www.odujinrinadefulu.com/documents/Does%20Nigeria%27s%20local%20content%20legislation%20b
reach%20its%20international%20obligations.pdf (accessed 17 April 2015). 
 
 
 
 
88 
 
related services;335 hence is not likely to be violating its commitments under the 
GATS in the oil and gas sector. Likewise, other aspects of Tanzania’s local content 
requirements, such as the employment of nationals, have been purposely left out in 
this discussion as they do not relate to the TRIMs. This is so because Article 1 
provides that the TRIMs applies to measures relating to the trade in goods.  
Finally, it should be pointed out that as the situation stands currently, the local 
content requirements hardly, if at all, violate the TRIMs and the GATT.  This is so 
because there is no law that makes it mandatory or imposes sanctions for local 
content requirements; hence they do not have a legal basis other than contractual, 
and are not enforceable in that sense. As for those found in the MPSAs it can be 
argued that they merely provide an indication of the government’s willingness to 
have local content requirements incorporated in the PSAs, in which case it is solely a 
contractual negotiation issue altogether.   
If anything, the PEP Act only provides for the employment of nationals. It says that 
an application for a development licence should be accompanied by detailed 
proposals with respect to the training and employment of citizens of Tanzania.336 
Tanzania needs therefore to enact a local content Act, and frame the provisions in a 
manner that is not discriminatory as discussed above. In addition to being WTO 
compliant, having legislation in place will make the country compliant with a non-
arbitrary standard as discussed in part 4.5.3 above. 
4.8. Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed the legal framework governing investment in oil and gas 
in Tanzania in comparison to international standards of foreign investment 
treatment. The underlying discussion centered on the PEP Act provisions as 
supplemented with provisions in the MPSAs and actual PSAs. There are aspects in 
                                                          
335https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S006.aspx?Query=%28%40Symbol%3d+gats%2fsc%2f*
%29+and+%28%28+%40Title%3d+tanzania+%29+or+%28%40CountryConcerned%3d+tanzania%29%29&L
anguage=ENGLISH&Context=FomerScriptedSearch&languageUIChanged=true. 
336Section 37 (b) of the PEP Act. 
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which the Tanzanian legal framework is doing better, such as subjecting itself to 
international and independent arbitration. Also, Tanzania’s local content 
requirements as existing currently do not conflict with the TRIMs. There are also 
aspects in which Tanzania could do better than currently, including for example, 
enacting a specific and comprehensive local content legislation, so that the 
requirements are not implemented arbitrarily, or amending the law to recognise 
Additional Profit Tax. The fact that the PEP Act was enacted 35 years ago means it 
has not been able to capture recent developments in the oil and gas industry globally 
and locally. An example is the local content requirements which have only surfaced 
in the African oil and gas context recently, taking into account that even Nigeria, 
which is Africa’s biggest oil producer, only enacted its Local Content Act in 2010. 
The next chapter provides in details the areas Tanzania could improve on. Being the 
last chapter, it revisits the previous chapters (1-4) and concludes in summary the 
findings. Most importantly, Chapter Five calls for the enactment of comprehensive 
upstream oil and gas legislation to provide for modern and a more relevant 
framework. 337  
                                                          
337 For further analysis and imperatives on specific comprehensive petroleum legislations in the 
continent see Mailula D ‘Protection of Petroleum Resources in Africa’(unpublished LLD thesis, 
University of South Africa, 2013) 404. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
It is undisputed that the discovery of oil and gas might have a big impact on 
Tanzania’s economy, which happens to be among the poorest economies in the 
world to date, and is still that of a least developed country. At the time of writing 
this thesis, more natural gas is being discovered in the country while major 
international oil companies (IOCs) are still busy exploring for oil.338 As discussed in 
part 1.3.3 in Chapter One, prospects are even higher now than ever before since the 
commencement of exploration.  It is thus only fair to put in place mechanisms, both 
legal and institutional, to ensure that the country taps the natural resource wealth, 
and the local population does benefit therefrom. 
However, while such is the aim, Tanzania has insufficient technical know-how and 
wealth to invest in an industry that is known for demanding intensive capital and 
which comes with risks, such as the fact that despite such investments oil and gas 
might not be discovered. Not to mention other country risks, such as political and 
legal. It is at this point that foreign investment becomes inevitable. But at the same 
time, foreign investors need assurances to mitigate the risks involved. That is why 
the need to balance local population interests and foreign investment risks comes 
into question.  
This investigation sought to look into the law relating to foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in oil and gas in Tanzania. Among other things, it looked at the framework the 
PEP Act laid down, and the practice on the ground. The main question was whether 
the law, being enacted 35 years ago, does provide for an investor friendly regime 
while at the same time guaranteeing local population benefits. The measure was the 
international standards of foreign investment treatment. Other questions, such as 
                                                          
338See part 1.3.1. 
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whether the recent developments in the industry are well captured in the Act, have 
been tackled.  
 
5.2 Summary of conclusions 
This study sought to provide an opportunity for policymakers in Tanzania to revisit 
the FDI legal framework by presenting a fair analysis of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the law. The aim was to contribute to the little literature on oil and 
gas law in Tanzania, especially in relation to FDI. Chapter One provided an 
introduction to this study and the imperatives for having in place good legislation 
for oil and gas in the country.  
Chapter Two revisited the theories and conceptual framework underlying 
investment in oil and gas. First it discussed the concept of oil and gas as property 
under the law. To that end, the meaning of oil and gas generally was given339, and 
then under the Tanzanian law.340 It was found that petroleum is a general term that 
technically means hydrocarbons found under the earth surface which can be in the 
form of gas, or liquid. When they’re in liquid form they are referred to as crude oil, 
and when they’re in gaseous form they are referred to as natural gas. So it was found 
that Tanzania’s law adopts this approach and uses the same legislation to govern oil 
and gas since they’re technically subsets of the same thing, that is, petroleum. 
The second part341 of Chapter Two discusses existing global models of ownership of, 
and allocation of rights in, oil and gas. This is because ownership gives rise to 
allocation of rights and regulation of investments. It was observed that Tanzania 
uses the national ownership theory, which vests all the natural resources in the form 
of oil and gas, whether discovered already or not, in the State. This explains the 
practice that licences are now granted to the national oil company, the Tanzania 
                                                          
339 See Section 2.2 
340 See Section 2.2.1 
341 Section 2.4. 
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Petroleum Development Corporation (TPDC) which then enters into production 
sharing agreements (PSAs) with international oil companies (IOCs). While the 
chapter traced the history of contracts the country entered into, namely, concessions, 
service agreements, and lately PSAs, it was clear that the Petroleum (Exploration 
&Production) Act (PEP Act) is silent on the form of contract to be entered into. The 
country has decided, for instance, to only use PSAs currently but it is not clear what 
the legal basis is for the preference for PSAs over other contracts, such as concessions 
and service agreements, since the Act does not specifically provide therefor. This is 
why the Act needs to be revisited to capture these aspects. If the country has decided 
that the PSA is the agreement that best covers the country’s interest, then the Act 
should state to that effect. 
Chapter Three identified the legal and institutional framework governing oil and gas 
investment in Tanzania. For the legal framework, this thesis centred mostly on the 
PEP Act which is the core legislation analysed in this thesis. It revisited the 
applicability of the Act342, and entry requirements for FDI.343 The findings in this part 
are the fact that the PEP Act clearly portrays the State’s interest to retain control over 
natural oil and gas resources.  On the other hand, having been enacted 35 years ago, 
the Act does not cover many aspects and is silent in crucial aspects, such as fiscal, 
some of which are supplemented by other pieces of legislation, and PSAs, and some 
of which are left untouched. For example, while the Act provides that a holder of 
licence is to pay a royalty, it is unclear in the Act what the rate is, although as 
established in the various PSAs the rate is known.  Further, the Additional Profit tax 
is neither provided for in the PEP Act nor the Income Tax Act, which raises issues as 
to its legitimacy.  There is a need to amend the Act to cover these aspects, or enact 
new comprehensive legislation for the oil and gas upstream sector in the country. 
                                                          
342 See Section 3.2.1 
343 See Section 3.2.2 
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Chapter Four examined the interface between the PEP Act and the protection of FDI 
in the oil and gas sector. It argued that there is a need to strike a balance between the 
powers of the State to regulate FDI to guarantee local population benefits, and 
protection of the same. States derive regulation powers from, among other things, 
the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (CERDS) and General Assembly 
Resolution 1803 (XVII) (1962) on permanent sovereignty over natural resources.  
The discussion compared the Tanzanian law to international minimum standards of 
protection of foreign investment. While the Tanzanian law has been found to be in 
no breach of international standards, there were some areas in which the country 
could have done better. Standards, such as, fair and equitable treatment, non-
discrimination, full protection and security and non-arbitrariness, were revisited.  
Tanzania has entered into several bilateral investment treaties and is a State Party to 
the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States (1965). 
In some areas in which Tanzania could do better include, for example, the regulatory 
ambiguity of the role of TPDC, and the proposed reforms on local content 
requirements. The TPDC should either be a strict national oil company and 
competitor on an equal footing with other oil companies, or remain a regulator with 
no participation interest at all. Or another legal entity should be set up to demarcate 
the roles. As for the local content requirements, first of all, the legitimacy of these 
requirements was raised because currently Tanzania does not have a local content 
law but only the first draft of a Local Content Policy. Should the policy lead to the 
enactment of legislation, there is a need to cushion it in a manner that does not 
violate the country’s obligations under the Agreement on Trade Related Investment 
Measures (TRIMS).344 
                                                          
344 See discussion under part 4.7.2 
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5.3 Recommendations 
From the foregoing, it is clear that the PEP Act has been a piece of legislation that the 
country could not do without for the past thirty-five years. However, the Act is 
outdated and falls short in properly addressing recent developments in the oil and 
gas industry, especially developments in the regulation of FDI. In particular these 
are regarding the following aspects; regulatory ambiguity; local content 
requirements; the role of the TPDC; confidentiality of PSAs; and the legal basis for 
the preference of PSAs over other forms of contract. The following part proposes 
solutions for these aspects. 
5.3.1 Regulatory ambiguity 
The PEP Act should be amended to cover the issue of an independent regulator. If 
the new gas policy will lead to an Act, then the new gas legislation should address 
the establishment of the authority that will be responsible for regulating the natural 
gas industry in the upstream sector. There should be a clear demarcation of the 
authority regulating gas industries and the activities of the Tanzania Petroleum 
Development Corporation (TPDC) which presently acts as the regulator. Under 
section 3 of the Energy and Water Utilities Regulatory Authority (EWURA) Act, No 
11 of 2001, natural gas transmission and distribution (downstream) falls under 
EWURA. However, the EWURA appears to have no power to regulate upstream 
activities which must be well regulated. The Gas Act should address this situation 
clearly or, since the Gas Act is likely to cover only the downstream sector, the PEP 
Act should be amended to address the situation. 
5.3.2 Local content requirements 
To give a legal basis for the local content requirements either the PEP Act should be 
reformed to incorporate the same, or a new local content Act should be enacted.  
This will safeguard local population benefits which are increasingly becoming a 
concern not only in Tanzania but also in other oil and gas rich countries in Africa. 
This will rid FDI in oil and gas from insecurity and guarantee full security as the 
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local population will not consider FDI as acting against their interests. But, the Act 
needs to be drafted in a way that does not threaten FDI and violate the TRIMs.345 
5.3.3 TPDC’s interests and participation in the licences 
 Under the existing regime the TPDC holds an interest in any undertaking, 
enterprise or project related to the exploration for, and production of, petroleum. 
This needs to be contained in the PEP Act. As the PEP Act is the main legislation, 
and it only provides for the issuing of licences to entities incorporated in the country, 
it is questionable from where the TPDC derives the power to hold licences and 
interests in every exploration or development licence.  TPDC Establishment Order of 
1966, as discussed in part 3.3.2 gives the Corporation a wide mandate including 
acquiring interests in oil and gas. This is in no way to say that the TPDC should not 
hold interests for the country in oil and gas, but whatever interests it does hold need 
to trace their legitimacy from the law, especially the main legislation.  The law needs 
to be stated with such a clarity as to leave no doubt.  
5.3.4 Legitimacy of PSAs 
It is understood why Tanzania may prefer PSAs over concession agreements or 
service agreements which it has since stopped entering into. PSAs seem to capture 
well the interests of the country to benefit from foreign investors’ know-how and 
capital while retaining some technology and know-how for its own citizens. PSAs 
also seem to be the preferred form of agreement in oil and gas exploration and 
production currently in the world. But the PEP Act does not contain any provision to 
that effect. The Act only gives powers to the Minister to enter into an agreement on 
behalf of the United Republic but it does not name the sort of contracts to be entered 
into. The Act may be hailed as it gives the government discretion, to pick any form 
of agreement and abandon some types of agreements if it finds them no longer 
capturing the country’s interests. But at the same time, it makes it appear to be an 
arbitrary move; hence contrary to the non-arbitrariness standard. If in the 1970s the 
                                                          
345 See Section 4.7.2 
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country used concessions, and in the 1980s there were service contracts, and there is 
no clear legal basis for these, it doesn’t guarantee that the country will not adopt 
other forms of contract in the future. It doesn’t portray the country’s commitment to 
stability. The Act should state whether it is concessions, service agreements or PSAs. 
5.3.5 Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) 
As indicated in Chapter Three, the PEP Act prohibits disclosure of information, 
which has been construed to mean that the contents of PSAs between the 
government and IOCs are a top secret.346 It is this kind of confidentiality that partly 
raises fears among the local population that they may not be benefitting from the 
natural resources as they should. This brings about ill-will against investors which 
takes away guarantees against violence and of security of the investors’ property.  
Such confidentiality points out that the Act has not been able to capture 
developments in the industry whereby governments are adopting transparency 
initiatives in the extractive industries.  
It is suggested that oil and gas contracts should be public. Since the State is entering 
into these contracts for and on behalf of the citizens, it is only fair to make them 
accessible. Provisions that criminalise disclosure of contracts and making them 
accessible to the public should be swept away. 
5.3.6 Adoption of comprehensive sector-specific legislation 
There is a need to have one comprehensive piece of legislation that comprises all the 
aspects relevant to oil and gas as presented in this thesis. Currently, oil and gas in 
Tanzania is regulated by different frameworks. As such there is no single piece of 
legislation that covers the sector exhaustively without relying on other pieces of 
legislation to come in aid.  According to experts, Tanzania is not a sole case.  
Variations do exist between different States, both developed and developing, with 
regard to the regulatory regimes relating to petroleum exploration and production. 
The regulatory framework in various petroleum producing countries can be 
                                                          
346 See section 3.2.9. 
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categorised into three systems, namely, a general legislation or sector-specific 
legislative system, an individually negotiated agreement system, and a hybrid 
system.  
One advantage of the general legislation or sector-specific legislation system is that 
the legislation provides for predetermined conditions under which the rights to 
explore for and exploit petroleum resources are granted. It could be standard 
licences, or leases, royalties or any other relevant elements. It also allows for the 
inclusion of broad government policy and objectives. It does also help to promote 
transparency, and accountability in the administration of the regulatory regime. 
5.4 Overall conclusion 
In conclusion, it is clear that the Petroleum (Exploration & Production) Act, No 27 of 
1980, was a milestone in oil and gas exploration in Tanzania. The enactment of the 
legislation has over the years helped the evolution of the oil and gas industry in the 
country and has shaped the direction in which the country is heading at the 
moment.  
However, as pointed out in this study, while the Act may have served, and may still 
be serving, the country, the purpose for which it was enacted, there have been 
developments in the industry that have emerged since, and having overtaken by the 
Act, haven’t been properly captured by the same. Most especially on FDI in the oil 
and gas sector, Act, there are some lacunae not covered by the Act, other legislation 
and the PSAs.  
It is therefore the proposition of this study that the law should be reformed to 
properly address local content requirements, the regulatory framework, the role of 
the Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation, and the confidentiality of PSAs. 
Finally, the law should address production sharing agreements as the preferred form 
of allocating oil and gas rights in the country. 
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For the least developed economy that is about to see the light at the end of the 
tunnel, these reforms are indispensable, especially for policymakers. It can only be 
hoped that the current wave of reforms will look into the suggestions made above.  
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